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PREFACE
In June of 1996, I was seconded by the United States Department
of State to work as a member of the mission to Bosnia and
Herzegovina of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe ("OSCE"). From July to December of 1996, I served as Chief
Prosecutor of the Election Appeals Sub-Commission, a multi-ethnic
supervisory body established by the Provisional Election
Commission to enforce electoral rules and regulations.
This paper describes and analyzes the OSCE's role in the elections
from an enforcement perspective. I have based much of what follows
on my personal observations. Where a footnote or other means of
elaboration does not accompany a factual statement or opinion, the
reader can safely assume it is mine. I have attempted to provide a real
flavor of how the Sub-Commission accomplished its work; however,
the confidential nature of my position restricts my narration. I have
omitted specific facts and details that I am not permitted to disclose.
Finally, I should acknowledge the obvious: I am not a
disinterested party either with respect to the elections or the Election
Appeals Sub-Commission. Indeed, I wrote, co-authored, or
participated in many of the reports, decisions, and advisory opinions
described or cited below. I have tried to provide a balanced account
of one small but important part of the international community's
response to the tragedy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A truly objective
appraisal, however, will have to be left to another.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the establishment of the United Nations and the end of
World War II, the international community has engaged in what has
been described as peace-keeping and, more recently, peace
enforcement.' Often these operations have involved ethnic conflicts
in the form of either civil war or so-called "mixed conflicts." Such
international peace-keeping efforts have included post-conflict civil
measures with an electoral component.3 In most cases, the electoral
component involved providing logistical support and technical
assistance to a governmental authority,4 as well as election
supervision and observation.5 In a few instances, the international
community was responsible for administering the elections.6 The
United Nations supervised post-conflict elections in both Namibia
and Cambodia.' In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the OSCE supervised

1. See Shashi Tharoor, Should UN Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics'?
SURvIVAL, Winter 1995-96, at 52. Mr. Tharoor, Special Assistant to the United
Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations, distinguishes
"traditional peace keeping" from what he calls "peace enforcement." He uses the
former term to describe the role of the U.N. when the parties have agreed to peace
and need the U.N. to help them "keep their word." Id at 53. "Peace enforcement,"
in contrast, applies to the introduction of peacekeeping forces in situations where
there is "no peace to keep." Id.at 58.
2. See Anthony Clark Arend, The United Nations, Regional Organizations
and Military Operations:The Pastand the Present,7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 3,
27 (1996) (citing John Norton Moore, The Use of Force in International
Relations: Norms Concerningthe Initiation of Coercion, in NATIONAL SECURITY
LAw 85, 139-40 (John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990) (defining "mixed conflicts"
as "civil wars with external intervention").
3. See generally Jon M. Ebersole, The United Nations' Response to Requests
for Assistance in ElectoralMatters, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 90 (1992) (setting forth the
United Nations' expanded role in monitoring elections as part of the peacekeeping
process).
4. See id, at 93 (explaining that the United Nations worked in conjunction
with the government to develop and administer elections).
5. See id.at 93-4 (citing U.N. CHARTER arts. 75-85 setting forth the U.N.'s
authority to participate in the electoral process of its members). "Supervision"
means "direct involvement in establishing the mechanisms of the election,"
including "issuing regulations, monitoring polling stations, and establishing
methods for dispute resolution." Id.at 94. In contrast, "observation" means less
direct U.N. involvement in the electoral process. See id.
6. See Ebersole, supra note 3, at 90 (stating that in Nicaragua and Haiti the
U.N. monitored elections within independent Member states for the first time).
7. See id. at 91 (1992) (detailing U.N. involvement in the elections). Ebersole

1998]

FROM DAYTON TO SARAJEVO

557

elections pursuant to Annex 3 of the General Framework Agreement
for Peace 8in Bosnia and Herzegovina ("Dayton Agreement" or
"Accords").
Proper election supervision requires rules and an enforcement
regime to ensure compliance with those rules. In Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Election Appeals Sub-Commission ("EASC" or
"Sub-Commission") was established to adjudicate complaints and
appeals arising under the rules for the September 14, 1996 election.
This paper describes the context in which those elections were held
and examines the role and work of the Sub-Commission.
An effective enforcement body must first establish its legitimacy.
In this context, legitimacy means a reputation for fairness,
independence, and impartiality. It also means having the authority to
enforce the law, along with the ability and will to exercise that
authority in a practical way. This paper argues that the SubCommission had sufficient enforcement powers to do its job and
utilized them in such a way as to establish its legitimacy. For the
Sub-Commission, this legitimacy involved two interrelated
considerations:
First, it meant balancing the need for expedition on the one hand
with procedural fairness on the other. By the time the SubCommission was established there were fewer than three months
until the election. There was simply no time for countless
investigations that might produce uncertain outcomes. At the same
time, however, the Sub-Commission's decisions had to be based on
credible evidence, and it had to provide at least a modicum of due
process to respondents. In achieving this balance, the SubCommission opted for what could be referred to as "rough justice."
Second, the Sub-Commission also had to consider the delicate
balance between enforcement in concrete cases and OSCE's overall
goal of proceeding with the elections as scheduled. The community
notes the U.N.'s increasingly important peace-keeping role in elections. He traces
the evolution of the U.N.'s involvement from its early supervision of referenda,

plebiscites, and elections in non-self-governing territories, to its role in supervising
the 1989 and 1993 elections in Namibia and Cambodia, respectively.
8. Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework of
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75

(1996) [hereinafter Dayton Agreement].
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perceiving its decisions as too draconian could have had the effect of
boycotts or other measures curtailing the elections altogether. On the
other hand, a weak approach would threaten the very integrity of the
elections by encouraging violations of the rules.
This paper concludes that the Sub-Commission established its
legitimacy as an enforcement body and thereby lived up to its
mandate. In so doing, the Sub-Commission made a positive
contribution to the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina and serves as
an enforcement model for future international election supervision.
Before examining the Sub-Commission and its work, this paper
introduces some background material. The first section contains a
guide to some frequently used names and acronyms. This section is
followed by a brief treatment of the origins of the Yugoslav state, its
disintegration, and the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.9 A
discussion of the Dayton Agreement and a detailed account of its
electoral provisions follow."0
The remainder of this paper focuses on the Election Appeals SubCommission. It first examines its mandate, its multiethnic and
international composition, and its relationship to the OSCE
Mission." Next is the most detailed part of the paper, entitled "The
Work of the EASC.' 12 It considers the challenges faced by the SubCommission, its decision-making process, and how it actually
functioned. 3 It also examines how the Sub-Commission handled
cases in a variety of areas, including technical legal questions," the
linking of humanitarian assistance to voter registration,"' violence
and intimidation, 6 secessionist speech and freedom of expression,"
9. See infra pt. I.B.
10. See infra pt. II.
11. See infra pts. IV.B-C.

12. See discussion, infra pt. V.
13. See discussion, infra pts. V.B-V.E..
14. See discussion, infra pt. V.F.1 (acknowledging problems with the
Provisional Election Commission, but recognizing that even with its precarious
position, the Sub-Commission upheld the PEC and its Rules and Regulations).
15. See discussion, infra pt. V.F.2. (describing the Sub-Commission's actions
regarding the rights of displaced persons to choose a voting location).
16. See discussion, infra pt. V.F.3 (describing the actions the Sub-Commission
took to curtail instances of violence and intimidation, especially in Una Sana
Canton).
17. See discussion, infra pt. V.F.4 (expressing the Sub-Commission's
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wrongdoing by local officials and political parties; 8 election-day
problems; 9 and OSCE failures regarding the overall vote count and
the allocation of seats.2" This paper next assesses the performance of
the Sub-Commission with respect to its mandate and concludes that
it was effective in its enforcement role.2 Finally, it considers the
lessons the international community can learn from the experience in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and concludes that a proper election
supervision program must include: 1) a set of comprehensive and
realistic electoral rules, including meaningful sanctions to discourage
violations; and 2) a credible body that will enforce those rules.'

GUIDE TO FREQUENTLY USED
NAMES AND ACRONYMS
The author uses the following names and acronyms throughout the
paper. While each is described in the following pages, this guide is
intended as a convenient point of reference.
Bosnia and Herzegovina or Bosnia refers to the sovereign state of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is comprised of two Entities. Each
Entity has a defined territory making up the whole of Bosnia.3
Federation refers to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
one of the two Entities. Reflecting both its origins during the war and
Bosnia's present reality, it is sometimes popularly referred to as the

dedication to freedom of expression, but also recognizing that such freedom was
not absolute).
18. See infra pt. V.F.5 (describing cases of illegal political party involvement
in voter registration, obstruction of voter education efforts, and police confiscation
of opposition campaign materials).
19. See infra pt. V.G (discussing problems with the voting list, polling and
counting center irregularities, refugee voting fraud, and other voting impediments).
20. See discussion, infra pt. V.H (detailing how the Sub-Commission dealt
with allegations that too many people voted, and complaints that the OSCE failed
to apply its published formula in calculating seats under the system of proportional

representation).
21. See discussion, infra pt. VI (evaluating the effectiveness of the SubCommission from the perspective of critics, participants, and peoples' adherence
to Commission decisions).
22. See discussion, infra pt. VII (outlining the factors that contributed to the
Sub-Commission's success, including enforcement powers, insulation,
impartiality, and speed).
23. See Dayton Agreement, annex 4, art. 1.3.
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Muslim-Croat Federation.24
Republika Srpska is the other Entity. Its post-war population is
overwhelmingly Serb.25
HDZ stands for the Croatian Democratic Union, one of the three
major nationalist parties in Bosnia. It is the Bosnian branch of
Croatia's HDZ. 6
SDA stands for the Party of Democratic Action, the major
nationalist party of Bosnia's Muslim population.27
SDS stands for the Serb Democratic Party, the major nationalist
party of Bosnia's Serb population.28
GFA refers to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Along with its annexes, it is commonly
known as the Dayton Agreement or Dayton Peace Accords.29
OSCE is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe,
a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter.3
PECrefers to the Provisional Election Commission, established by
the OSCE to supervise Bosnia's first post-war elections. 3'
24. See id. (stating that the Federation is really two Muslim-Croat entities).
25. See generally Tracy Wilkinson, In Push for Bosnian Vote, Problems Get
Glossed Over, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1996, at Al (defining Republika Srpska as the
Serbian half of Bosnia-Herzegovina).
26. See Hardline Croats Threaten to Boycott Mostar City Council, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, July 12, 1996, at 1 [hereinafter Hardline Croats], available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (detailing the June 30, 1996, municipal polls
in which Mijo Brajkovic headed the Croatian Democratic Union's list).
27. See NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY 218 (1994) (explaining
the establishment of Bosnia's first post-communist and non-communist Muslim
party in May 1990).
28. See, e.g., id. (comparing the SDS, founded in Bosnia in July 1989, with
another party already fighting for autonomy in the Croatian Krajina).
29. See Paul C. Szasz, Introductionto Dayton Agreement, supranote 8 (stating
that the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was
initiated at an Air Force base near Dayton, Ohio, on Nov. 21, 1995, and concluded
on Dec. 14, 1995, in Paris).
30. See Bonnie Jenkins, The Enhancement of Politicaland MilitaryStability in
the Former Yugoslavia through the Use of InternationalLaw: Annex I-B of the
General Framework Agreement, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1920, 1934 n.6 (1996)
(tracing the development of the OSCE from the CSCE founded on Aug. 1, 1975,
in Helsinki, Finland).
31. See Report to Head of Mission, Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n Org. for
Sec. and Cooperation in Eur., Mission to Bosnia & Herzegovina, Oct. 4, 1996, at

1998]

FROMDAYTON TO SARAJEVO

Sub-Commission or EASC refers to the Election Appeals SubCommission, which the PEC established to enforce election rules and
regulations.32

I. BACKGROUND
A. ELECTION DAY

On September 14, 1996, internationally-supervised elections were
held throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina for the country's threemember presidency, national legislature, and other offices.33 The
following day President Clinton proclaimed the election "a
remarkable step forward. ' 3 4 Not everyone was quite as sanguine. A
editor at The Nation, for example, described them as a
contributing
"farce."35 These comments reflect the dichotomy of views expressed
about the elections. Despite this dichotomy, however, two salient
facts remain. First, despite nearly four years of civil war that had
officially ended only nine months earlier, violence did not mar
election day. 6 Second, the three "nationalist" political parties were
the overwhelming victors that day.37 They were the same parties that
had come to power in 1990 as the former Yugoslav republic
disintegrated into a series of ethnic conflicts that would both horrify
and confound the international community.3"
11 [hereinafter Report to Head of Mission].
32. See id
33. See Tracy Wilkinson, Bosnian Elections Reaffirm Massive Ethnic Division
in Balkans: BallotingIs Chaotic But Mostly Peaceful, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996,
at Al.
34. Id
35. Slavenka Drakulic, Bosnia's Democratic Charade,THE NATION, Sept. 23,
1996, at 14 (explaining that the election was a farce because elementary conditions
for democratic elections did not exist). Drakulic further states that the election was
nothing more than "a sideshow performance to President Clinton's re-election
campaign." Id
36. See Sir Kenneth Scott, 'Free and Fair' Vote in Bosnia Elections, THE
THvIES, Oct. 16, 1996, at 1, available in Lexis, News Library, Curnws File.
37. But see id (stating that the opposition parties not only took part in the
elections, they won 57 out of 265 seats, making a noticeable dent in the monopoly
of power).
38. See MALCOLM, supra note 27, at 213-33 (providing a brief history of the
tactics and policies these newly formed nationalist groups adopted to gain power
and deepen the rift between the groups).
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B. DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

For centuries, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires had
dominated various parts of the territory that would become
Yugoslavia.39 One can trace the modem concept of a single Balkan
state comprising the South Slavic ("Yugoslav") nationalities back to
the Nineteenth Century.4" The first Yugoslavia was created in 1918
as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.4 Its composition
was multiethnic and multiconfessional. Religious, ethnic, and
regional conflict marked its existence." The first Yugoslavia came to
an end in World War II with occupation by the Axis powers, civil
war, interethnic violence, and genocide.43
Josip Broz, the partisan fighter who came to be known simply as
Tito, created the modem Yugoslav state.44 As a dedicated
revolutionary, he induced his multiethnic followers to put aside old
feuds and hatreds to unite in common purpose against the enemy. 5
Socialist Yugoslavia comprised six republics and two autonomous
provinces within the largest of the republics, Serbia.46 In addition to
Serbia, the republics constituting the former Yugoslavia were
Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia and
39. See id. at 82-92, 136-55 (discussing the various campaigns and battles over
territories that came to form Yugoslavia).
40. See LENARD J. COHEN, BROKEN BONDS: THE DISINTEGRATION OF
YUGOSLAVIA

4 (1993).

41. See MALCOLM, supra note 27, at 161-62 (discussing the founding of the
new Slovene, Croat, and Serb State on Oct. 29, 1918).
42. See COHEN, supra note 40, at 13-26.
43. See MALCOLM, supra note 27, at 174 (noting that there were a number of
"wars" within Yugoslavia from 1941-45). Germany and Italy initially waged war
on Yugoslavia itself. Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Italian-controlled
Albania annexed portions of the country. See id. The Allies and Axis Powers
fought over strategically important areas. See id. The Axis Powers fought the
resistance movements. See id. There were two civil wars: between Croat extremists
and the Serb populations of Bosnia and Croatia; and between the two main
resistance movements, the Serb Cetniks and Tito's Partisans. See id.
44. See id. at 177, 193 (describing Tito as Josep Broz, a former AustroHungarian Army Corporal, and acknowledging his contribution to Yugoslavia's
reunification after World War II).
45. See FITZROY MACLEAN, EASTERN APPROACHES 338 (Time-Life Books
1964) (1949); see also COHEN, supra note 40, at 22-23 (examining the tactical
advantages of the "Yugoslav communists' emphasis on ethnic equality").
46. See ALEX N. DRAGNICH, SERBS AND CROATS: THE STRUGGLE IN
YUGOSLAVIA

121 (1992).
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Herzegovina.47 Each republic had a majority ethnic group.4" Most had
other ethnic groups as substantial minorities.4 9
Tito's Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in the late 1980s and early
90s. During his rule of Yugoslavia, Tito repressed ethnic identities
in favor of the Yugoslav state."' After his death in 1980 and the
subsequent upheavals in the Soviet Union and the socialist countries
of Central and Eastern Europe, the long-repressed ethnic and
religious identifies of the population of Yugoslavia rose to the
surface.5" As the 1980s were drawing to a close, Serb nationalism
became a dominant force in the politics of the former Yugoslavia."
Serbia was the most populous of the republics. Its capital, Belgrade,
was also the capital of the Yugoslav state. During this period,
Slobodan Milosevic rose to power, fanning the flames of Serb
nationalism.54 In Croatia, Franjo Tudjman rode a resurgent Croat
nationalism to power.55 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija
Izetbegovic, a Muslim, became President of the Republic. 6

47. See id
48. See id at 165.

49. See id at 121 (setting forth Tito's strategy of weakening Serbia through the
dispersal of Serbians in the remaining republics).
50. See generally LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A
NATION (rev. ed. Penguin Books 1996) (describing the complexity of the
disintegration). The brief discussion here draws heavily on this detailed account of
the political and military events both accompanying and driving the war in the
former Yugoslavia.
51. See id. at 26 (stating that "[e]thnic grievances had been suppressed, not
dispelled, by the centralized Communist system"); see also COHEN, supra note 40,
at 27 (charting socialist strategies in managing ethno-regional diversity). The
"[r]apid creation of 'all-Yugoslav' consciousness to replace group identities"
characterized the early period, from 1945-1952. Id. State structure was top-down
Bolshevik-style federalism. See id In later periods, official recognition of diverse
ethnic and regional interests varied and state power devolved to some extent to the
republics. See id
52. See DRAGNICH, supranote 46, at 137.
53. See id at 204, 213 (noting the growth of Serbian nationalism as an
increasingly destructive force marked by the commemoration of the Battle of
Kosovo on June 28, 1989).
54. See

MALCOLM,

supra note 27, at 211-12 (noting Milosevic's rise to

power).
55. Seeid at215.

56. See id at 222-23 (detailing Izetbegovic's government of national unity,
which was a coalition among all three major parties, and explaining other aspects
of the elections).
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Ultimately, these three leaders would agree to peace in Dayton, Ohio
in November of 1995.57
58
The ethnic nationalism resulted in secession or "disassociation"
of four of the six republics, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
the creation of a rump Yugoslavia composed of Serbia and
Montenegro." Slovenia, the most ethnically homogeneous of the six
republics, was the first to secede.6" There was a brief "war," but
Slovenia's secession was relatively free of disruption.6' Shortly
thereafter, Croatia seceded.62 In contrast to Slovenia, the secession of
Croatia occasioned a bitter war between it and the remaining
Yugoslav state, then dominated by Serbia.63 Then followed the
secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a republic dominated by its
Muslim or "Bosniac" population, but with high percentages of both
Croats and Serbs.'
The history of the conflict is infinitely complex and difficult to
comprehend, and the author makes no attempt to recount it in any
significant detail. To have some understanding of the internationallysupervised elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, it is

57. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 8 (noting the initial peace negotiations
in Dayton, Ohio on Nov. 21, 1995).
58. See SILBER & LITrLE, supra note 50, at 167 n.2 (explaining that
"disassociation" implies that the individual republics were free to leave the
federation, since Yugoslavia was arguably structured as a voluntary union of
nations).
59. See id.
60. See MALCOLM, supra note 27, at 214-15 (detailing Slovenia's move toward
succession as a means to protect itself from Milosevic's constitutional coup); see
also id.at 225 (discussing Slovenia's independence on June 25, 1991).
61. See id. at 225.
62. See id.

63. See id. at 215-18 (articulating Serb defiance of the Croatian government);
see also id at 225 (stating Croatia's declaration of independence on June 25,
1991).
64. See id. at 1. Besides Muslims, Croat Roman Catholics, and Orthodox Serbs
also reside in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Id.Ethnicity in the context of Bosnia,
however, can be both misleading and confusing. Malcolm notes the existence of
many "bogus theories of racial-ethnic identity [that have] dominated the politics of
the Balkan lands." Id.
He concludes that by the Twelfth Century "[a]ll that one can
sensibly say about the ethnic identity of the Bosnians is this: they were the Slavs
who lived in Bosnia." Id. at 12. Nonetheless, history shows that three major
identifiable groups, or subcultures, emerged in the territory of today's Bosnia. See
id.
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important to know that the road leading to those elections included:
1) the creation of self-proclaimed ethnic mini-states within Croatia
and Bosnia,65 2) shifting alliances among the republics and warring
factions, 66 3) ethnic
cleansing, 67 and 4) a genocidal war in Bosnia and
68
Herzegovina.

II. THE DAYTON AGREEMENT
A. INTRODUCTION

On October 31, 1995, representatives from Serbia, Croatia, and
Bosnia and Herzegovina arrived in Dayton, Ohio for the so-called
proximity talks that began the next day. United States Assistant
Secretary of State Richard Holbrook led the negotiations, which
attempted to reach a settlement on the Bosnia-Herzegovina
conflict.69 On November 21, 1995, Presidents Tudjman of Croatia,
Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Izetbegovic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialed the General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina." On December 14,
1995, these same men signed the Paris Treaty that formalized the
agreement they had reached in Dayton.7 '
It is generally believed that a number of factors led to the Dayton
negotiations. Chief among them was the August 31st NATO
bombing campaign that began two days after the Bosnian-Serb
shelling of a marketplace in Sarajevo; the shelling left 37 dead and
80 wounded.72 As the NATO attacks were about to begin, President

65. See id at 231-33 (discussing the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

66. See id
67. See Anthony Borden, Bosnia's Democratic Charade, THE NATION, Sept.

23, 1996, at 14 (discussing the process of ethnic homogenization in Republika
Srpska and Herzegovina).

68. See id
69. See SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 50, at 369-70 (stating that Presidents
Tudjman and Milosevic also worked out a deal involving the status of eastern

Slovenia). The participants also reached an agreement with respect to the MuslimCroat Federation. See id
70. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 8, at 75.
71. See id
72. See SILBER& LITTLE, supra note 50, at 365-68.
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Milosevic extracted from the Bosnian-Serbs the right to represent
them in any future peace negotiations." "Operation Deliberate
Force," as it was called, continued for two weeks. During that time,
NATO flew 3,400 sorties, delivering a punishing blow to the
Bosnian-Serb military operation.74
The Dayton negotiations did not go smoothly. On a number of
occasions, it appeared that they would end poorly." Ultimately,
however, the leaders reached an agreement, setting the stage for the
introduction of 60,000 NATO troops, including 20,000 Americans,
and an international civilian bureaucracy to administer elections and
other non-military aspects of the peace agreement.76
B. GENERAL DESCRIPTION
The Dayton Agreement consists of a General Framework
Agreement ("GFA"), and 12 annexes. 7 In GFA Article I, the
Parties 71 commit themselves to "conduct their relations in accordance
with the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter," and to
"settle disputes by peaceful means, and refrain from any action, by
threat or use of force or otherwise, against the territorial integrity or
political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other
State., 79 Articles II through VIII include commitments to the various
programs and arrangements set forth in the annexes."0
Annexes I-A and I-B address military and regional stabilization
measures." Annex 2 establishes an Inter-Entity Boundary Line,
which is effectively a border between the two "entities" comprising

73. See id. at 366 (hypothesizing that the imminence of the NATO action may

have forced the Bosnian Serbs to act).
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., William J. Durch & James A. Schear, Faultlines: UN Operations

in the Former Yugoslavia, in U.N.

PEACEKEEPING, AMERICAN POLICY, AND THE
UNCIVIL WARS OF THE 1990s, at 193, 24749 (William J. Durch ed., 1996).
76. See SILBER & LITTLE,supra note 50, at 377-78.

77. Dayton Agreement, supranote 8, at 75.
78. See id.
annex IA, at 92 (defining the "parties" to include the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the
Republika Srpska).
79. See id.
art. I, at 89.
80. See id arts. II-VIII, at 90
81. See id.annex 1A-IB, at 92, 109-11.
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the sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.Y2 Additionally,
Annex 2 provides for arbitration over the disputed area of Brcko, on
which the parties could not agree at Dayton.83 Annex 3 is the
Agreement on Elections,4 which will be discussed in some detail
below. Annex 4 is the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.' It
basically provides for a sovereign state of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
composed of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Republika Srpska. 6 Annex 5 sets forth the commitment of the
Federation and Republika Srpska to submit to arbitration to resolve
disputes between themY Annex 6 is the Agreement on Human
Rights.88 It describes commitments to fundamental rights and
freedoms and establishes human rights bodies and mechanisms. 9
Annex 7 is the Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons."0 It
sets forth the rights of such persons to return to their pre-war homes9 '
and establishes a commission to decide real property claims. 2 Annex
8 establishes an independent commission to preserve national
monuments. 93 Annex 9 establishes commissions to look into the
possibility of establishing joint entity public corporations in the areas
of utility, energy, postal, communication, and transportation
facilities. 94 Annex 10 provides for the designation of a High
Representative charged with overseeing implementation of the
civilian aspects of the peace settlement." Annex 11 calls for a United
Nations International Police Task Force ("IPTF") 9' to provide a law
enforcement monitoring and assistance program throughout the
country, and further obligates the Parties to fully cooperate with

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Dayton Agreement, supra note 8, annex 2.
Id art. V.
Id annex 3.
Id annex 4.
Id
Dayton Agreement, supra note 8, annex 5.

88. Id annex 6.
89. Id
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id annex 7.
Id art. .1.
Dayton Agreement, supra note 8, annex 7, art. VII.
Id annex 8.
Id annex 9.
Id annex 10.

96. Id annex 11.
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IPTF. 97
C. AGREEMENT ON ELECTIONS

The purpose of Annex 3 was "to promote free, fair, and
democratic elections, and to lay the foundation for representative
government and ensure the progressive achievement of democratic
goals throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.""8 The Agreement gave
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe the
responsibility to supervise the preparation and conduct of elections. 99
The OSCE is a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the
United Nations Charter. It began its existence in the early 1970s as
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE")100
and functioned as a series of meetings and conferences promoting
dialogue and negotiation between the East and West in multilateral
fora.0 Its activities included the setting of various norms and
reviewing their implementation.'0 2 The Charter of Paris for a New
Europe,' O3 signed in 1990, served as the transition of CSCE from a
forum for negotiation to a formal operational structure.' 0 4 At the 1994
Budapest Summit, CSCE became the OSCE. 05 There are 54 member
states, including all of the states of the former Soviet Union, the
United States, and Canada.'0 6
Annex 3 required the elections to be held between six to nine
months after the Dayton Agreement entered into force."0 " It required
the parties to ensure the existence of suitable conditions for elections
and gave OSCE the responsibility of certifying that the elections

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Dayton Agreement, supra note 8, annex 11, arts. IV-V.
Id.
annex 3.
See id.
art. 11.2.
See Jenkins, supra note 30, at 1934 & n.6.
See id.
See SECRETARIAT OF THE ORG. FOR SEC. AND CO-OPERATION IN EUR.,

OSCE HANDBOOK (2d. ed. 1996) [hereinafter OSCE HANDBOOK]. The Secretariat
is located in Vienna, Austria.
103. See id.

104. See id.
105. See Jenkins, supra note 30, at 1934 & n.6 (discussing the transition from
the CSCE to the OSCE).

106. See id.
107. See Dayton Agreement, supranote 8, annex 3, art. 11.4.
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could be held under existing conditions." 8 Article 11.3 gave OSCE
the authority to establish a Provisional Election Commission
("PEC").0 9 Article III.1 required the PEC to adopt rules and
regulations on election conduct."0 The PEC consisted of the OSCE
Head of Mission, designated as Chairman; the High Representative
or his or her designee; representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska;
and other persons as the Chairman may decide in consultation with
the Bosnian members.'
Implicitly, the PEC was to operate by
consensus. The Chairman, however,
was empowered to make final
2
decisions in the event of disputes.-"
Under Article 111.2, the PEC mandate included: supervising all
aspects of the electoral process;'.' determining voter registration
provisions;' 14 ensuring compliance with electoral rules and
regulations; ensuring that action is taken to remedy violations of
the Agreement on Elections and electoral rules and regulations,
including the imposition of penalties against violators; 6 and
as well as ensuring their unimpeded
accrediting election observers,
7
access and movement."
Pursuant to Article IV, "Any citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina
aged 18 or older whose name appears on the 1991 census for Bosnia
and Herzegovina shall be eligible, in accordance with the rules and
regulations, to vote."118 It also sets forth a "general rule" that citizens
no longer living in their 1991 residence should nonetheless be
expected to vote there." 9 The rule, however, allowed them to apply
to the PEC to vote elsewhere. 20 Finally, the PEC was empowered to
adopt eligibility provisions for those citizens not listed in the 1991
108. See id art. 1.
109. See id art. 11.3.

110. See id art. Ill.1.
111. See id. art. 111.3.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Dayton Agreement, supranote 8, annex 3, art. 111.3.
See id art. II1.2(a).
See id art. 111.2(b).
See id art. III.2(c).
See id at 116, annex 3, art. III.2(d).
Dayton Agreement, supra note 8, art. III.2(e).

118. Id art. IV.1.
119. See id
120. See id
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census. 121

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF ANNEX 3--OSCE'S
ROLE AND THE PROVISIONAL ELECTION
COMMISSION
A. OSCE MISSION TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The December 8, 1995, meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council,
held in Budapest, established the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and
Herzegovina. As a modest operation with authorized personnel
strength of between five and six persons, the OSCE had already been
operating in the country as the OSCE Mission in Sarajevo. The
Ministerial Council decision of December 8, 1995, expanded the
prior mission.1 2 By way of contrast, the expanded mission was to
operate with approximately 250 authorized members. Additionally,
the governments of OSCE Member States were to second the
mission.
B. OSCE-SUPERVISED ELECTIONS
Article 11.2 of Annex 3 to the General Framework Agreement
describes the supervisory role of OSCE with respect to specifically
enumerated elections:
The Parties request the OSCE to supervise, in a manner to be determined
by the OSCE and in cooperation with other international organizations
the OSCE deems necessary, the preparation and conduct of elections for
the House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina; for the
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina; for the House of Representatives

of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; for the National Assembly
of the Republika Srpska; for the Presidency of the Republika Srpska; and,
if feasible,23 for cantonal legislatures and municipal governing
authorities.1

In its Rules and Regulations, 124 the PEC set September 14, 1996,
121. See id.
122. See OSCE HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at 33.
123. Dayton Agreement, supranote 8, annex 3, art. 11.2.
124. Rules and Regulations: OSCE-Mission to Bosnia & Herzegovina,
ProvisionalElection Commission, SLU2BENI LIST, July 24, 1996 [hereinafter PEC
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as the date for the higher level elections mandated by Annex 3.' It
also made clear its intention to hold discretionary elections at the
same time for the municipal assemblies throughout Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the cantonal assemblies in the Federation." 6 As
discussed below, the elections for municipal assemblies were not
held as scheduled. They were first postponed on August 27, 1996.11,
C. PROVISIONAL ELECTION COMMISSION

United States Ambassador Robert Frowick was the Head of the
OSCE Mission. Under Annex 3 to the Dayton Agreement, the Head
of the Mission also served as Chairman of the Provisional Election
Commission. 2 1 In conformance with Annex 3, members of the PEC
included the designee of the High Commissioner and representatives
of the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina (a Muslim), 129 the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (a Croat), 3 ' and the Republika Srpska (a
Serb). 131 Other members included the Honorable John Reid, a
Canadian, and Sir Kenneth Scott, a former Ambassador to
Yugoslavia from Great Britain who served as Deputy Head of
Mission for Elections and as Acting Chairman of the PEC in
32
Ambassador Frowick's absence.
The PEC adopted the Rules and Regulations in accordance with
Article 11.1 of Annex 3 to the Dayton Agreement. 33 The Official
Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sludbeni List, compiled and

Rules]. Sludbeni List, the Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina, contains the
PEC Rules and Regulations, including three supplements applicable to the
September 14, 1996 elections. The PEC issued supplements on August 15th,
August 27th, September 13th, and October 9th. The principal volume is on file
with the International and Foreign Law Collection at Georgetown University Law

Center in Washington, D.C.
125. See Dayton Agreement, supranote 8, at 115, annex 3.
126. See PEC Rules, supranote 124, art. 3.
127. See John Pomfret, US. Diplomat Delays Local Voting in Bosnia, WASH.
POST, Aug. 28, 1996, at Al.

128. See Dayton Agreement, supranote 8, at 116, annex 3, art. 111.3.
129. See id at 116, annex 3, art. II1.3.
130. See id
131. See id

132. See Scott, supranote 36, at 1 (explaining that Ambassador Scott regularly
presided over meetings of the PEC).

133. See Dayton Agreement, supranote 8, at 115, annex 3, art. 11.1.
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published them on July 24th.14 The Rules and Regulations are
organized as follows: Part I on the holding of municipal and higher
elections on September 14, 1996; Part II on voter and candidate
eligibility; Part III on the establishment of local election
commissions; Part IV on the registration of political parties and
independent candidates; Part V on criteria for polling stations and
disruptions to the voting process; Part VI on the voting process,
including rules regarding the mechanics of voting, voter education
provisions, and a system of proportional representation for legislative
elections; Part VII on an electoral code of conduct for political
parties, candidates, and election workers; and Part VIII on provisions
establishing the Election Appeals Sub-Commission and the Media
Experts Commission, a description of their respective mandates, and
rules and regulations for international election observers.' 35

IV. THE ELECTION APPEALS SUBCOMMISSION-ITS MANDATE AND
COMPOSITION
A. MANDATE OF THE ELECTION APPEALS SUB-COMMISSION

The PEC established the EASC as a "juridical body whose four
members are appointed by the Chairman of the Provisional Election
Commission in consultation with its members."' 36 The PEC
delegated powers to the EASC.'37 Once constituted, it was to "report
to the head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina."'' Its
function was "to ensure compliance with the electoral Rules and
Regulations established by the Provisional Election Commission and
adjudicate complaints with regard to the electoral process referred to
it by the Provisional Election Commission, the Media Experts
Commission, political parties, candidates, individuals and other
entities. '
Under Article 138, Sub-Commission jurisdiction

134. See PEC Rules, supra note 124.
135. See id.
136. Id.
pt. III, art. 137.

137. See id art. 138 (establishing that the EASC derives its authority from the
PEC).
138. Id.pt. III, art. 137.
139. Id.art. 138.
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specifically included the following:
a) Violations of provisions on elections in the General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
b) Violations of the Rules and Regulations of the Provisional Election
Commission:
(i)

Additions, deletions or changes in the Provisional Voter's List;

(ii)

Standards of professional conduct for members of the media;

(iii) Regulations concerning the obligations of governments in
relation to the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
(iv) The Electoral Code of Conduct for political parties, candidates,
and election workers;
(v)

Rules

for registering

political

parties

and

independent

candidates;
(vi) Any other procedures or rules, including polling and counting
procedures established by the Provisional Election Commission."

The PEC generally authorized the Sub-Commission "to impose
appropriate penalties and/or fines against any individual, candidate,
party or body that violates" the rules and regulations. 4 ' Specifically,
the Sub-Commission had the power to "prohibit a political party
from running in the elections, decertify a party already listed on the
ballot, remove a candidate from a party list or an independent
candidate from the ballot when it determines a violation of the
principles established by the General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina or [PEC Rules and Regulations]
has occurred."' 42 The Sub-Commission was also specifically
authorized to "set and apply pecuniary or other appropriate penalties
for actions carried out with intent to disrupt the electoral process.
Decisions of the Sub-Commission were to be binding and not subject
to appeal.144
John Reid, a Canadian member of the Provisional Election
Commission seconded to the OSCE Mission, was the principal
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See PECRules, supra note 124.
Id art. 140.
Id art. 141.
Id.
Id art. 142.
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author of the Rules and Regulations.'45 In designing the enforcement
scheme, he drew upon his experience as a politician in Canada where
he had been a Member of Parliament from 1969-1984. 46 In drafting
the enforcement rules, he targeted political party leadership "because
that is the only way you can control a system where voters vote for
party lists." He also believed that removal of a candidate's name
from a party list was one way "to strike fear into the heart of any
politician." Initially, he proposed to call the enforcement body a
"tribunal" in order "to associate it with active power-not
necessarily a more passive, procedurally correct court system." He
recalls that "tribunal" was rejected because of its association with the
proceedings in the Hague and a feeling by the Head of Mission that
the enforcement body should be under the political leadership of the
OSCE Mission as constituted in the Provisional Election
Commission. Interestingly, his original proposal called for only one
international and one local judge.
B. COMPOSITION OF THE EASC

On June 19, 1996, Sir Kenneth Scott, Acting Chairman of the
PEC,147 appointed the four Members of the Election Appeals SubCommission. 148 All four served throughout the period covered by this
paper. 49 Article 137 of the PEC Rules and Regulations mandate that
the Chairman "be a distinguished international lawyer or jurist with
election experience."' 5 ° Scott appointed Norwegian Judge Finn

145. Mr. Reid was one of the first members of the OSCE Mission to arrive in
Sarajevo in January of 1996. The account of his role in the writing of the PEC
Rules and Regulations and the establishment of the EASC is based upon
conversations and e-mail correspondence between Mr. Reid and the author.
146. Mr. Reid did not base the enforcement regime on any previous model of

international election supervision. Indeed, literature on the enforcement
component of international election supervision is virtually non-existent.
147. See Report on the Election Monitoring in Bosnia and Herzegovina (visited
<http://www.OSCEPRAG.CZ/inst/Parlamen/Bosnia.htm>
Sept.
14,
1996)
[hereinafter OSCE Report-Sept. 14, 1996].
148. See Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Mission to
Bosnia and Herzegovina (visited June 28, 1996) <http://www.OSCE.Austria.eu.

net/press/ pr0628e.htm> [hereinafter PEC Sub-Commission June Appointment].
149. See Report to Head of Mission, supra note 31 (discussing the tenure of
Sub-Commission appointees).
150. PECRules, supra note 124, art. 137.
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Lynghjem as Chairman.' The three Bosnian appointees to the SubCommission were senior judges from the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the two Entities comprising the state.5 2 Following
the pattern of the PEC membership, each also represented one of the
three major ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Bosniac
(Muslim), Croat, and Serb. Suada Selimovic, a judge of the Supreme
Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, represented the
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.'53 Venceslav Ilic, also a judge of
the Supreme Court of the Federation, represented the Federation. 4
Gojko Dursun, Director of the Republika Srpska's Institute for the
Payment of Transactions and a former judge in Sarajevo, represented
Republika Srpska."'
Article 137 of the PEC Rules and Regulations also provides for
the Sub-Commission to "be served by a staff of four lawyers, one
from an OSCE participating state,"' 56 and three Bosnian lawyers
representing the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska 57 In a practice,
consistent with the composition of the PEC and the Sub-Commission
itself, the three Bosnian lawyers represented each of the three major
ethnic groups in the country. Two of these Sub-Commission lawyers
were actually judges in Sarajevo. Sadudin Kratovic, a judge on the
Supreme Court of the Federation, represented Bosnia and
Herzegovina; 5 ' Jasminka Putica, a judge of the Higher Court in
Sarajevo, represented the Federation;5 9 and Vitomir Peric, Secretary
of the Republic Ministry of Legislature and a law professor,
represented Republika Srpska 6
Although the PEC Rules and Regulations provide for only four
lawyers, 16 ' it soon became apparent that additional lawyers would be

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See OSCE Report-Sept. 14, 1996, supra note 147.
See PEC Rules, supra note 124, art. 137.
See PEC Sub-Commission June Appointment supra note 148.
See id
See id
PEC Rules, supranote 124, art. 137.
See id
See PEC Sub-Commission June Appointment, supra note 148.

159. See id
160. See id
161. See PECRules,supranote 124, art. 137.
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necessary for the Sub-Commission to fulfill its mandate. The
international community filled this need with attorneys from Great
Britain, the United States, and Canada. International lawyers
included the author, designated as Chief Prosecutor, who in July
succeeded W.G. Robinson, Q.C., of Canada.' 62 From mid-August
through the elections, five more international attorneys joined the
Sub-Commission's legal staff.163 The Sub-Commission also enlisted
the services of a Special Investigator, an American International
Police Task Force ("IPTF") monitor, whom IPTF Commissioner
Fitzgerald assigned to the Sub-Commission' 64 Local Sub165
Commission staff included secretaries and interpreter/translators.
66
At its largest point, this group numbered seven.1
C. GETTING STARTED
The members of the Sub-Commission were sworn in on July 2,
1996. At this point, it was an exceedingly modest operation. The
Chairman, special investigator, and international counsel shared a
small office in Mission headquarters with a single computer. Three
local staff members provided secretarial, interpretation, and
translation services. There was neither a law library nor significant
access to legal materials apart from the Dayton Agreement and the
Rules and Regulations of the PEC. The Sub-Commission's task was
made more difficult because the elections were scheduled for
September 14th-just ten weeks away.
By this time, the Sub-Commission had produced its own
procedural rules. 67 At this point, no one could have predicted what
the Sub-Commission would become and how it would fulfill its
mandate.
162. See Report to Head of Mission, supra note 3 1, at 11 n.2 (noting that Mr.
Robinson became a senior advisor to the Head of the Mission and was appointed

to the Provisional Election Commission in October 1996).
163. See id. at 11 (discussing the Sub-Commission's Appointment of attorneys
Sandra Coliver, Stephan Bowen, Jeffrey Buenger, Sandra Mitchell, and Marcia
Waldron).
164. See id. (discussing the Appointment of Special Investigator Michael Ilaria).

165. See id. at 12 (discussing the Sub-Commission's support staff).
166. See id. (discussing Sub-Commission staffing assignments).
167. Sub-Commission rules restated relevant provisions of the PEC Rules and
Regulations, as well as procedural guidelines for the filing and consideration of

complaints. The rules are neither particularly important nor generally available.
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D. WAS THE EASC A JUDICIAL BODY?
Article 137 of the PEC Rules and Regulations described the SubCommission as a "juridical body" whose four judges had authority to
make legal decisions on cases that came within its jursidiction. " Yet
the Sub-Commission reported to the Head of the OSCE Mission, also
designated as the Chairman of the Provisional Election
Commission-a political figure with virtually complete control over
the conduct of the elections.'69 Legally, the Sub-Commission
operated under the authority of the PEC, which derived its authority
from the Dayton Agreement. 7" In essence, it was a quasi-judicial
body whose independence was circumscribed by its relationship to
the PEC and the Head of the OSCE Mission.' As with any newly
constituted body making legal decisions in a political environment, it
would have to test the limits of its authority on a case-by-case basis.

V. THE WORK OF THE EASC
A. JULY OF 1996- A BLANK TABLET
Even more than the OSCE Mission, the Sub-Commission was
writing on a blank tablet. What type of cases would be referred to it?
Would individuals and political parties make use of it? How would
the Sub-Commission go about its work? Would it have sufficient
resources? Would its Members be able to work together, in light of
the deep ethnic divisions made deeper by four years of war? Would
its decisions be enforceable? Would they be timely? Could it play an
effective role with only two and a half months to election day? On
July 2, 1996, no one knew the answers to these questions. In the
course of the next weeks and months, the Sub-Commission would
have to find a way to meet the challenges it would face, adapting to
the changing circumstances in a fluid election process.

168. See PEC Rules, supranote 124, art. 137.
169. See Dayton Agreement, supranote 8, annex 3, art. II (explaining the PEC's
sweeping powers with respect to all aspects of the elections); id art. 111.3 (stating
that the Chairman's decision would be final in case of disputes within the PEC; in
effect, the Chairman's word was the law).
170. See id annex 3.
171. See id
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B. POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
Within just a few months in 1990, Bosnia's three principal
nationalist political parties were founded.' 72 The Muslims established
the Party of Democratic Action ("SDA"), 113 the Serbs created the
Serb Democratic Party ("SDS"),"' and the Croats formed a Bosnian
branch of the Croatian Democratic Union ("HDZ").'" In the
elections held later that year, these parties won over eighty percent of
the seats in the bicameral Parliament. 76 They also controlled the sixmember rotating presidency.' Most of the voters had voted along
ethnic lines.'78 These same parties would maintain their hold on
power through the years of war that followed' 79 and were in power as
preparations were underway to implement the electoral provisions of
the Dayton Agreement.180
Many people have written about the "ethnic cleansing" that
occurred during the war in Bosnia and the resultant partitions of the
country into ethnically based enclaves. 18 ' "[F]reedom of
172. See SILBER& LITTLE, supra note 50, at 206-13 (discussing the creation of
the political parties that represented Bosnia's Muslims, Serbs, and Croats in the
November 9, 1990 election).
173. See id. at 207 (detailing the May 26, 1990 establishment of the Party of
Democratic Action as a "political alliance of Yugoslav citizens belonging to
Muslim cultural and historical traditions").
174. See id. at 209 (outlining the rise of the Serbian Democratic Party).
175. See id. (discussing the creation of the Croatian Democratic Union as a
response to Serbian plans to push for a new government elected on the basis of
one-person, one-vote principles).
176. See id. at 210 (detailing how out of the 240 seats in the 1990 bicameral
Parliament, the "SDA won eighty-seven seats, the SDS seventy-one, and the HDZ
forty-four" seats).
177. See SILBER & LITTLE, supra note 50, at 211 (identifying the rotating
presidency as composed of two Muslims, two Serbs, two Croats, and one
Yugoslav).
178. See id at 210 (discussing how the percentages of Muslims, Serbs, and
Croats within the former Yugoslavia paralleled the percentage of seats won by
each group in the 1990 bicameral Parliament election).
179. See id.at 212-17 (detailing the roles the SDS, SDA, and HDZ played in
Yugoslav politics during the early 1990s).
180. See, e.g., Serb Party Nominates Karadzic, WASH. POST, June 21, 1996, at
A30 (discussing the Serb Democratic Party's involvement in the 1996 Bosnian
presidential elections).
181. See, e.g., THIS TIME WE KNEW: WESTERN RESPONSES TO GENOCIDE IN

BOSNIA 363-401 (Thomas Cushman & Stuepan G. Mestrovic eds., 1996) (setting
forth a series of indictments issued by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
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movement," 1 despite its status as a condition for democratic
elections under the Dayton Agreement, was not a reality."8 Making
arrangements were difficult as well. Despite the short distance
between Pale and Sarajevo, telephone contact was virtually
impossible. An over-burdened satellite phone was used to
communicate with a local OSCE office in Republika Srpska, which
would convey messages from Sarajevo. It was not uncommon for a
simple message and confirmation to consume the better part of a day.
These communication difficulties extended to the investigative work

of the Sub-Commission. Notification to both witnesses and parties to
a complaint was a constant challenge.
C. RESOURCES AND WORK ENVIRONMENT

Not surprisingly, an insufficiency of both personnel and other
resources presented a continuing problem. Three international
staffers were responsible for the Sub-Commission's work during the
first six weeks of its existence. These staffers included the Chairman,
the international legal counsel, and the special investigator. These

three individuals investigated cases, researched and analyzed the law,
wrote decisions and opinions, supervised translations and distribution
of rulings, coordinated efforts with the Bosnian judges and lawyers
and the various OSCE offices, and dealt with the numerous
former Yugoslavia against persons charged with war crimes).
182. Dayton Agreement, supra note 8, annex 3, art 1.1 (stating that "[t]he Parties
shall ensure that conditions exist for.., free and fair elections ... and shall ensure
freedom of movement").
183. See, e.g., Muslim Sites Bombed in Key Bosnia Area, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 3,
1996, at A10 (discussing a pre-election Serb bombing of a disputed area of Bosnia
where Serbian forces sought to prevent Muslims from returning to their homes).
Examples of this lack of freedom of movement were myriad and could be
observed in the everyday functioning of both the PEC and Sub-Commission. The
OSCE Mission was located in Sarajevo, the capital of both Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Federation Entity. Pale, the capital of Republika Srpska, is
about 20 minutes away by car. When attending meetings of PEC, an ostentatious
contingent of heavily armed NATO troops from Italy escorted Slobodan Kovac,
the PEC's Serb member, from Pale to OSCE headquarters. During the meetings,
they would stand guard outside the headquarters with their weapons drawn,
waiting to make the return trip. While the necessity of this highly visible military
escort was questionable, it reflected the difficulty of unescorted travel in areas
between the two Entities. Indeed, on meeting days the Sub-Commission itself
would arrange to pick up its Serb judge and lawyer in an official OSCE car and to
return them to Pale after the meetings were concluded.
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administrative tasks attendant to running an office.
After the issuance of its first few rulings, some members of the
international community in Bosnia became aware that the SubCommission could play a positive role in the election process. As a
result, the Sub-Commission was able to obtain the services of five
additional lawyers in the month of August.'84 Without them, the job
could not have been done.
In addition to inadequate provisions for personnel, the SubCommission faced continuing problems in obtaining necessary
equipment. This equipment included vehicles, computers, printers,
and copy machines. These problems resulted in delays and
inefficiencies.
Such difficulties are all too predictable. The OSCE Mission itself
was created out of nothing. There was no permanent bureaucracy in
place that could move its operations to Sarajevo. Rather, an
organization had to be built from the ground up under the auspices of
the OSCE. This organization depended upon member states for its
budget, staffing, and in-kind contributions. From an administrative
standpoint, the Sub-Commission was just one of many units in the
Mission competing for limited resources. At the outset, there was
neither a realistic staffing plan nor a realistic projection of its
budgetary or other needs. Consequently, there was a constant
struggle to obtain the bare necessities. 5
While hardly a unique situation, it is useful to understand some of
the more mundane concerns faced by the Sub-Commission as it
184. The interest and cooperation of the following organizations made this

possible: the United States Agency for International Development, the American
Bar Association Central and Eastern Europe Law Initiative, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the Office of the High Representative.

185. Problems of this type were certainly not unique to the OSCE Mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Election Appeals Sub-Commission. An account

from the 1993 elections held in Cambodia under the authority of the United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia ("UNTAC") sounds a similar theme.
There, an official noted start-up problems with the unit established to monitor
compliance with UNTAC's electoral law: "The office is hardly even set up

because we have no staff. There are only two of us at the moment, and it is
difficult to operate under these conditions." Interview: Mtshana M Ncube,
ELECTORAL COMPONENT NEWSLETTER (UNTAC), Oct. 23, 1992, at 14. At the
time, Mr. Ncube was the Acting Head of the Complaints, Compliance and
Enforcement Unit, UNTAC Electoral Component.
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attempted to fulfill its mandate.

D. DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
As discussed more fully below, the Sub-Commission produced
advisory opinions and written decisions on complaints and appeals.
In early July, one key question was how the Sub-Commission would
actually function to produce its work. The Sub-Commission initially
assumed that the four lawyers'86 would meet in advance of the judges
to discuss matters that would be considered when the judges
convened as members of the Sub-Commission. Independent of the
judges, the lawyers would decide on an agenda for the SubCommission meeting and make recommendations on specific cases.
The staff attempted this plan at first, but quickly abandoned it
because it was too unwieldy and time-consuming. Then, a close
collaboration quickly evolved between the Chairman and the
members of the international legal staff, including the Chief
Prosecutor, in determining agendas and making recommendations to
the Members for specific action. In advance of the meetings, when
time permitted, the staff prepared draft opinions and decisions in
English and in one or more variants of the local language."8'
It should be noted that the Bosnian judges and lawyers all
maintained their principal jobs while serving on the SubCommission. As a result, the investigation and preparation of
specific cases fell to the full-time international component and local
support staff of secretaries and interpreter/translators.
Typically, the Bosnian lawyers and judges would arrive at SubCommission offices in advance of a scheduled meeting to review the
relevant materials for that meeting. The Sub-Commission held all
meetings in Executive Session. It held most of these meetings around
a large conference table in the Sub-Commission offices at the
University of Sarajevo Faculty of Law. The Chairman would make
opening remarks and introduce the agenda item before one of the
international attorneys presented the case. On occasion, the special
186. See PEC Rules, supra note 124, art. 137 (providing for one international
lawyer and three Bosnian lawyers to serve the Sub-Commission).
187. Cf CATHERINE SAMAY, YUGOSLAVIA DISMEMBERED 37-38 (1995)

(discussing the pre-war breakdown of Bosnia and Herzegovina's common SerboCroatian language into separate Serb, Croat, and Bosnian languages).

582

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[13:553

investigator would present his findings or show a videotape as
evidence. Only once did the Sub-Commission invite an outside party
to address it and only then because of concerns expressed about a
possible violent response to an impending decision. After the
attorney's presentation, the Chairman would open the floor for
discussion. Both the judges and the lawyers would have an
opportunity to express themselves on the matter. A collegial and
relatively informal atmosphere developed. 8' The Sub-Commission
kept no formal record of the deliberations, although the Chairman
kept a hand-written book of decisions reflecting the outcomes and
any dissenting votes.
Depending on the case, there would either be an immediate
consensus to go forward with a recommendation or a need for some
level of discussion. Such discussion might include the expression of
minor concerns involving language or an extended debate on the
facts and law at issue. The result of such discussion could range from
rejection of the recommendation to its acceptance with minor
modifications. The Chairman would always strive for consensus,
although the Sub-Commission's written decisions and opinions
generally did not reflect the vote of individual members. Publicly
distributed decisions and opinions reflected only the Chairman's
name."8 9 There were no concurring or dissenting opinions.
The members of the Sub-Commission decided early on that their
deliberations would not be publicly disclosed, and that no public
record would exist regarding their votes in specific matters. 9 ' The
188. See Sub-Commission Rules, supra note 167. The Sub-Commission
provided for fairly elaborate hearings. Since time and resource constraints made
this level of elaborateness unrealistic, the Sub-Commission never used these
procedures.

189. See, e.g., In the Matter of Complaints Filed by the Party for Democratic
Action (SDA) Against Various Polling Stations in the Mostar Area, No. 96-114;
96-138, 3 Bilten 203 (1996) [hereinafter SDA Complaints] (limiting signature on
judgment to Judge Finn Lynghjem).

190. See Report to Head of Mission, supra note 31, at 12 (stating that "the SubCommission decided that there would be... no public record of their votes in
specific matters"). The Sub-Commission easily reached this decision as a practical
response to the pressures its Bosnian Members endured. The rationale is analogous
to that of the European Court of Justice, described as follows:
The most important protection the judges have against national pressure is the fact that
there is always just one "judgment of the court" without any separate concurring or
dissenting judgments. Since... the judges swear to uphold the secrecy of their
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members deviated from this course of action twice when they
decided that the matters were of such importance to the electoral
process that a public declaration of their unanimity was in order.""
At the conclusion of a meeting, staff would prepare the final
written decisions or advisory opinions in four languages: English,
Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian. The Sub-Commission would
thereafter distribute these decisions to the PEC, OSCE staff, the
press, various international organizations, and the parties to 93a
complaint or appeal. The Bilten,'" a publication of Sluibeni List,
which publishes laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the
Rules and Regulations of the PEC, 94 published selected decisions
and advisory opinions' 9 The Bilten published three volumes
covering Sub-Commission decisions and advisory opinions through
September 28, 199696
E. THE SUB-COMMISSION ESTABLISHES ITSELF
On June 15, 1996, a mob attacked and injured Dr. Haris Silajdic,
the President of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina ("SBiH") and
its candidate for the Muslim seat on the three-member Presidency"9
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while he was campaigning in the
municipality of Cazin in the Federation.' 98 The physical attack, from

deliberations, it is never known how individual judges voted. Therefore it is
impossible to accuse ajudge of being insufficiently sensitive to national interests or of
having "let his government down ...."
TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COmiUNITY LAw 49-50

(2d ed. 1988).

191. See discussion, infra notes 373-75,490 and accompanying text.

192. See, e.g., 3 Bilten 1(1996) (setting forth Sub-Commission decisions).

193. See PEC Rules, supra note 124 (demonstrating containment of laws in
SluibeniList).

194. See id
195. See id
196. Not all decisions were published in the Bilten. The Chairman, in
consultation with the international legal staff, would decide if the decisions were
of sufficient importance to be placed in this publication.
197. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 8, art. V (noting in English the
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina's presidency provision that stated: "The
Presidency shall consist of three members: one Bosniac and one Croat, each
directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected
from the territory of the Republika Srpska").
198. See In the Matter of Alleged Violation of the General Framework
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which the candidate fully recovered, was the culmination of a series
of violent incidents that had disrupted a number of campaign events
that day. 199 Mr. Silajdic was a well-known public figure in the
country, having served as both Foreign Minister and Prime Minister
in the government headed by President Izetbegovic, and having been
a participant in the Proximity Talks leading to the Dayton
Agreement.2"0 The attack received widespread attention in the press,
and television news broadcasts repeatedly played a videotape of the
candidate bleeding from a head wound. The candidate's party filed a
complaint with the PEC.2° '
On June 25, 1996, the PEC referred the matter to the SubCommission.0 2 Although the members of the Sub-Commission had
yet to be formally sworn in, special investigator Michael Ilaria of the
United States, whom the IPTF Commissioner had recently assigned
to assist the Sub-Commission, immediately commenced an
investigation.0 3 In the course of the investigation, Party for
Democratic Action ("SDA") representatives attempted to distance
themselves from the violently pro-SDA mobs that had caused the
disturbances leading to the attack on Dr. Silajdic.'0 4 On July 1Ith, the
Sub-Commission reached its decision.0 5 It found that the attack, and
the previous incidents of campaign violence and intimidation
directed against the candidate and his supporters earlier in the day,
constituted a serious violation of Annex 3 to the Dayton Agreement
and the Rules and Regulations of the PEC. 0 6 The decision fixed
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Electoral Code of
Conduct-Attack of 15th of June 1996 on the Leader of the Party for Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Dr. Haris Silajdzic, in Cazin, No. 96-1B, 1 Bilten 5 (1996), Election

Appeals Sub-Commission Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina [hereinafter Case No. 96-1B] (discussing the
June 15, 1996, attack on Dr. Silajdzic).
199. See id.at 5 (discussing events leading up to the attack on Dr. Silajdzic).
200. See id.
201. See id. (articulating the procedural posture of the Provisional Election
Commission's investigation of the attack on Dr. Silajdzic).
202. See id.
203. See Case No. 96-1B, supranote 198, at 5.
204. See id. at 8 (detailing how the SDA Party's influence on the local Cazin
police department hindered any investigation linking the SDA to the attack on Dr.
Silajdzic).

205. See id at 5.
206. See id at 8.
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responsibility on the political party of President Izetbegovic, the
SDA, and the local police force." 7 The Sub-Commission exercised
its powers under the Rules and Regulations by striking the first seven
names from the party list of the SDA for the municipal elections in
Cazin,2 ' and formally censuring the Chief of Police of the
municipality for police inaction with respect to the attack.2' Both the
SDA and SBiH criticized the Sub-Commission's ruling, as did the
Minister of Internal Affairs who had overall authority over the police
in the Federation. 210 Given the high profile nature of the case, people
began to notice that this new and relatively obscure body had opened
for business.
The Siladic case was important for several reasons. First, it
demonstrated the Sub-Commission's relevance and the OSCE's
commitment to "promote conditions conducive to the conduct of a
free and fair election and a climate of democratic tolerance in which
political activity can take place during the election period without
fear of coercion, intimidation or reprisals. ' 21 ' The Silajdic incident
was a case of intolerable violence and intimidation directed against a
candidate and his supporters. The fact that the violence was a
Muslim-on-Muslim attack in no way diminished its potential for
spawning violent incidents among the ethnic communities of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, whose peace was still fragile. If there was to be
any chance of a reasonably conducive atmosphere for the conduct of
democratic elections, prompt and decisive action was essential. With
this decision, the Sub-Commission and the OSCE announced that the
parties would pay a price if its supporters engaged in political

207. See id
208. See Case No. 96-1B, supra note 198, at 8. Legislative elections, including

municipal elections, were to be based on a system of proportional representation.
See PEC Rules, supra note 124, art. 91. Parties competing in a particular
legislative race were required to submit a list of candidates to the PEC. See id. art.
44. Depending upon the proportion of votes a party received in a given race, a
number of its listed candidates could be elected to the particular legislative body.
209. See Case No. 96-1B, supranote 198, at 8.
210. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Avdo Hebib, is a Muslim. It is doubtful he
had much actual authority over the police in Federation areas under the political
control of Croats and the HDZ. While the full extent of his authority in
Bosniac/SDA-controlled areas is unknown, it clearly existed. See discussion, infra
note 307.
211. PEC Rules, supranote 124, art. 119.
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violence.
Second, it demonstrated that Muslims, Croats, and Serbs on the
Sub-Commission could work together in common purpose."' Given
the mistrust, hurt, and enmity that had developed among these
communities during the course of the war this was a significant
achievement.2" 3
Third, it provided the Sub-Commission with an early opportunity
in a concrete and important case to test its authority in a very short
campaign season. In this first major decision, the Sub-Commission
fully explored the applicable law of the Dayton Agreement and the
Rules and Regulations of the PEC, 2 4 establishing both the violation
and the Sub-Commission's powers of enforcement. With this case,
the Sub-Commission had begun to chart its course as election day
drew near.
The Sub-Commission principally relied on two provisions in the
Dayton Agreement that reinforced the fundamental importance of
openness and fairness in democratic elections and imposed an
unambiguous obligation to comply with PEC rules.
The Attachment to Annex 3 of the Dayton Agreement includes
paragraphs 7 and 8 from the Document of the Second Meeting of the
Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, Copenhagen, 1990.215 Paragraph 7 is
designed "[t]o ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of

212. The Dayton Agreement established a number of institutions ensuring
representation of each of the three major ethnic groups, and including extensive
participation in those bodies by the international community. In addition to the
PEC, these institutions include: the Joint Military Commission, see art. VIII, annex
1-A; the Constitutional Court, see art. VI, annex 4; the Joint Interim Commission
on implementation chaired by the High Representative, see annex II to annex 4;
the Commission on Human Rights, see ch. 2, annex 6; the Commission for
Displaced Persons and Refugees, see ch. 2, annex 7; the Commission to Preserve
National Monuments, see art. II, annex 8; and the Commission on Public
Corporations, see art. I, annex 9.
213. Cf Toward a Balkan Deal, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1995, at A20
(discussing the prospect of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina after a period of
"profound mistrust and ethnic blindness").
214. See Case No. 96-1B, supranote 198, at 6-8.

215. See Document of the Second Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (June 1990),
U.S. Gov. Doc. Y4.SE2:C791089-C. 1089-D (MF).
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the authority of government"2
participating states will:

6

587

Sub-paragraph 7.7 provides that

ensure that law and public policy work to permit campaigning to be
conducted in a fair and free atmosphere in which neither administrative
action, violence nor intimidation bars the parties and the candidates from
freely presenting their views and qualifications, or prevent the voters
from learning 217
and discussing them or from casting their vote free of fear
of retribution.

Article II.1 of Annex 3 provides, in pertinent part:
The Commission shall adopt electoral rules and regulations regarding...
the ensuring of an open and fair electoral campaign .... The Parties shall
comply fully with the electoral 21
rules
and regulations, any internal laws
8
and regulations notwithstanding.

Part VII of the PEC Rules and Regulations comprises the Electoral
Code of Conduct for Political Parties, Candidates, and Election
Workers ("Code").2 19 Each party must accept the Code before a party
or candidate can be registered for the elections."0 Article 119 fixes
responsibility on political parties and candidates to ensure the Code's
observance:
The object of this Code is to promote conditions conducive to the conduct
of a free and fair election and a climate of democratic tolerance in which
political activity can take place during the election period without fear of
coercion, intimidation or reprisals. The Code is binding on all political
parties and candidates, who must declare their acceptance of it before
being registered by the Provisional Election Commission. It is the
responsibility ofpoliticalparties and candidates to ensure that the Code
is strictly observed
by all their representatives, campaign workers and
221
active supporters.
Article 122 specifically addresses the obligations undertaken by

registered parties and candidates to ensure that conditions are

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Dayton Agreement, supranote 8, annex 3.
Id
Id art. 111.1.
See PECRules, supra note 124, arts. 119-24.
See id
Id (emphasis added).
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conducive to the conduct of a free and fair election:
All registered parties and candidates will respect the right of other parties
and candidates participating in the election to conduct their campaigns in
a peaceful environment, to hold public meetings and to have access to all
forms of public media in order to explain their policies, to canvass freely
for membership and support from the voters, and to publish and distribute
notices of meetings, placards, posters and other written publicity material.
They will refrain from disruption of meetings held by other parties and
candidates and will not use, or incite others to use, any form of violence
or intimidation against other parties and candidates or their
222
supporters ....

The Sub-Commission concluded that the above provisions placed
a weighty obligation on political parties to control their supporters
and that violations by their supporters must be imputed to the

parties. 223 The Sub-Commission then addressed its own powers under
the PEC Rules and Regulations.2 14 As noted above, enforcement of
violations of the Code was specifically included in the SubCommission's jurisdiction. 22' The Sub-Commission had considerable
enforcement powers granted to it. 226 Two provisions are pertinent:

Article 140
The Election Appeals Sub-Commission will have the right to impose
appropriate penalties and/or fines against any individual, candidate, party
or body that violates the Rules and Regulations established by the
Provisional Election Commission. In applying penalties and/or fines the
Election Appeals Sub-Commission shall take the following factors into
account:
(a) The responsibility of party leaders for their actions and those of their
party members;
(b) The responsibility of candidates on party lists for their actions and
those of their supporters; and

222. Id.
223. See PECRules, supranote 124, art. 122.
224. See id. art. 140 (stating that Sub-Commission shall consider "[t]he
responsibility of Party leaders for their actions and those of their party members"
when imposing sanctions).
225. See id.art. 138 (discussing the Sub-Commission's enforcement process).
226. Id.
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(c) The responsibility of227independent candidates for their actions and
those of their supporters.

Article 141
The Election Appeals Sub-Commission may prohibit a political party
from running in the elections, decertify a party already listed on the
ballot, remove a candidate from a party list or an independent candidate
from the ballot when it determines a violation of the principles
established in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina or the Rules and Regulations established by the Provisional
Election Commission has occurred. The Election Appeals SubCommission may set and apply pecuniary or other appropriate penalties
for actions carried out with the intent to disrupt the electoral process.228

The Sub-Commission acted pursuant to these provision in
removing the names of the first seven SDA party candidates from the
SDA party list for the municipal elections in Cazin, for the SDA's
involvement in the Silajdic attack.29 It must be noted that the SubCommission made no findings against the seven candidates struck
from the list.23 The action taken was against the party itself; the
seven candidates were casualties of the violation imputed to the
party." With respect to the police, Sub-Commission jurisdiction was
arguable. In any case, there was no realistic enforcement power.
Instead, the Sub-Commission settled for a public rebuke:
The Police of Cazin have behaved unprofessionally and disgracefully,
and the Chief of Police, Mr. Kaukovic Sead, is hereby censured by the
Election Appeals Sub-Commission. 232

Reaction to the decision was mixed. OSCE personnel, including
the PEC, were generally supportive. There were, however, some

227. Id art. 140.
228. PEC Rules, supra note 124, art. 141.
229. See Case No. 96-1B, supra note 198, at 7-9 (setting forth a jurisdictional
basis in articles 140 and 141 for striking SDA members from municipal elections

in Cazin).
230. See id at 8-9 (discussing why election violations committed by SDA
members were imputed to the SDA Party).
231. See id at 8 (removing the SDA candidates because "[e]very move that
occurred by the mob in Cazin can be related to the local SDA Party").
232. Id
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misgivings about the fairness of removing the seven candidates. As
reported by Agence FrancePresse, the Chairman of SDA's executive
board told the official Bosnian press agency that the decision was a
"double failure that missed the point. 2 33 The SDA president in Cazin
was reported to have called the decision "absurd" since none of the
candidates removed was involved in the attack. 3
The Minister of Internal Affairs for the Federation protested to the
PEC regarding the censure of the Cazin police.235 The party of Dr.
Silajdic complained that the punishment was not strong enough.
Nonetheless, this obscure regulatory body had taken action in a high
profile case and had begun to become known.

F. REVIEW OF MAJOR DECISIONS
On October 4, 1996, the Sub-Commission issued a Report to Head
of Mission that summarized its work both before and after the
elections of September 14th.236
From July 2nd through the end of October, the Sub-Commission
published 153 decisions and seven advisory opinions.237 One hundred
of the decisions were issued after election day, as the SubCommission struggled to cope with a deluge of complaints
concerning problems encountered by voters at the polls and alleged
irregularities with respect to the voting process and the counting of
ballots. Many of the post-election decisions were summary in
nature13 as the Sub-Commission's resources were strained, and it
consciously chose to concentrate its efforts on those cases having a
233. OSCE Bans Seven Candidatesfrom Bosnia Elections, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, July 12, 1996, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See Report to Head of Mission, supranote 31, at I1 (summarizing the Sub-

Commission's personnel, decision-making process, decisions, advisory opinions,
and recommendations to the PEC). The report was included in Volume 3 of the
Bilten. The author was the principal author of the report, which was a joint effort
of the international legal staff.
237. After October of 1996, the Sub-Commission's work with respect to the
September 1996 elections effectively came to end.
238. See, e.g., In the Matter of a Complaint by the People's Party of Republika
Srpska that Ballots Were Intentionally Spoiled at Counting Centers, No. 96-214, 3
Bilten 251 (1996) [hereinafter Case No. 96-214] (finding ballot fraud occurred in
the vote-counting center of Kotor Varos).

1998]

FROM DAYTON TO SARAJEVO

greater potential impact on the results and overall fairness of the
elections. All seven advisory opinions and 53 of its decisions were
issued prior to election day. 9
Prior to the elections, the Sub-Commission struck candidates from
party lists in three cases;24 removed members of local election
commissions in five cases;24 ' required a political party, official, or
candidate to broadcast an apology or clarification in five cases;24 and
imposed monetary penalties in five more.243
Although there is a degree of overlap, the Sub-Commission rulings
can be roughly categorized according to the principle issues they
addressed: 1) technical questions relating to the Dayton Agreement,
the Rules and Regulations, and the powers of the PEC;2 ' 2) the
linking of humanitarian assistance to voter registration;245 3)
instances of violence and intimidation; 2 6 4) secessionism,
239. See, e.g., Election Day Environment, Advisory Opinion 7, 1 Bilten 143
(1996) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion 7] (detailing the Sub-Commission's
concerns and hopes for the 1996 elections).
240. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Involvement of the SDS Commission on
Refugees and Displaced Persons of Doboj Municipality in the Linking of
Humanitarian Assistance to the Voter Registration Process, No. 96-9B, 2 Bilten 7
(1996) [hereinafter Case No. 96-9B] (involving the striking of two SDS
candidates); Case No. 96-IB, supra note 198, at 7 (involving the striking of seven
SDA candidates).
241. See, e.g., Case No. 96-214, supra note 238 (dismissing the Chairman of the
Kotor Varos Counting Center from his position for "fail[ing] to fulfill his duties to
safeguard the ballots being counted").
242. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Tenor and Content of the SDS Campaign,
No. 96-34B, 3 Bilten 147, 148 (1996) [hereinafter Case No. 96-34B] (publishing
an apology read by Dr. Biljana Plavsic for SDS election campaign statements that
violated the spirit of the Dayton Agreement).
243. See, e.g., In the Matter of Complaints Against the SDS Alleging that the
Party has made Statements Threatening the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 96-24B, 3 Bilten 119, 120 (1996) [hereinafter Case
No. 24B] (fining SDS US$50,000 for party statements made in violation of the
General Framework Agreement and the Rules and Regulations of the PEC).
244. See, e.g., Municipal Elections, Advisory Opinion 6, 3 Bilten 115 (1996)
[hereinafter Advisory Opinion 6] (warning political parties that Article 121 of the
PEC Rules and Regulations prohibits the holding of unilateral municipal
elections).
245. See, e.g., Voter Registration Irregularities, Advisory Opinion 1, 1 Bilten 33
[hereinafter Advisory Opinion 1] (stating that "it is illegal to condition
humanitarian assistance on where a person chooses to vote").
246. See, e.g., Case No. 96-1B, supra note 198 (detailing an SDA attack on Dr.
Silajdzic).
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secessionist speech, and freedom of expression;247 5) misfeasance or
malfeasance on the part of local officials and parties;248 6) electionday problems;249 and 7) OSCE failures---overall vote count and seat
allocation °
1. Technical Questions
Complainants challenged the authority of the PEC to prescribe
2 52
regulations,' questioned specific applications of the regulations,
and claimed factual errors on which the PEC made certain decisions.
In one case, a complainant challenged the Dayton Agreement itself.
In all these cases, the Sub-Commission effectively upheld the
authority of the PEC and its Rules and Regulations. While the cases
are not very significant in the larger scheme or particularly
interesting to recount, they proved helpful to the functioning of the
Sub-Commission. Specifically, they provided relatively noncontroversial issues that helped the Sub-Commission to develop a
common understanding of, and approach to, the Rules and
Regulations. It was a practical approach. The Sub-Commission
understood that the Rules and Regulations were imperfect and that
some of the decisions of the PEC were flawed.
In considering these cases, the Sub-Commission recognized that
the PEC was acting in good faith under difficult circumstances to
conduct complicated elections in a short time frame. The SubCommission also realized that it was a part of the overall Mission
effort. It was not delegated unlimited authority by the PEC to

247. See, e.g., Case No. 96-34B, supra note 242 (sanctioning SDS officials for
speech questioning "the integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina").

248. See, e.g., Case No. 96-214, supra note 238 (finding that "Pane Gavric
failed to fulfill his duties to safeguard the ballots being counted").
249. See id. (addressing voting site fraud).
250. See, e.g., In the Matter of the Number of Seats Allocated to Certain
Political Parties, No. 96-225, 3 Bilten 255 (1996) [hereinafter Case No. 96-225]
(addressing complaints from various political parties that election results were
calculated improperly).
25 1. See, e.g., In the Matter of a Complaint Filed by the Government of the
Republika Srpska, Office of the Vice-President of Internal Affairs, Regarding
Application of Provisional Election Commission Rules and Regulations, No. 944B, 1 Bilten 29 (1996) (challenging the authority of the PEC and its application of
PEC Rules and Regulations).
252. See id.
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second-guess PEC decisions. Most of the opinions in this arbitrary
category were not published in the Bilten. One decision in a case
questioning the legality of the Rules and Regulations was published
and is described below under "Secessionism, Secessionist Speech
and Freedom of Expression.2 53
2. Linking HumanitarianAssistance to Voter Registration
The Sub-Commission issued an advisory opinion and two
decisions regarding the rights of displaced persons to choose where
to vote. The war and ethnic cleansing created a multitude of
refugees, as well as internally displaced persons throughout Bosnia
and Herzegovina.2" During voter registration in July, OSCE human
rights monitors discovered that displaced persons in various parts of
Republika Srpska were being coerced into registering to vote in their
current domiciles in lieu of voting either in person or by absentee
ballot in their pre-war homes. Specifically, there were reports that
some local officials were conditioning humanitarian assistance on
this decision.1 6 In effect, the displaced persons were told that if they
wanted food and shelter they would have to vote in the locales where
they were receiving that food and shelter. Such an approach, of
course, would only intensify and help make permanent the effective
partition of the country.
Since time was running out on voter registration, the SubCommission decided to issue its first advisory opinion. z' There
simply wasn't time to conduct an investigation and reach a
determination that would have a deterrent effect on the practice. The
253. See discussion, infra pt. V.F.4.
254. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion 7, supra note 239 ("ensuring the safety of

persons traveling to and from polling stations on election day").
255. See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 1, 2

(1996) [hereinafter ICG REPORT] (discussing the displacement of over two million
people in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the period prior to elections). Many
ethnic Serbs who came from what is now the Federation Entity are living in
Republika Srpska, while Croats and Muslims from Republika Srpska are living in
the Federation. See idWithin the Federation itself, there are areas that are Muslim
and Croat enclaves. See id Under the Dayton Agreement, all citizens have the
right to return to their pre-war homes. See Dayton Agreement, supranote 8, art. 2.
256. See Advisory Opinion 1, supranote 245 (addressing the concern that social
welfare benefits were "conditioned on where individuals intend to vote").
257. See id
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opinion served as a warning to "all individuals, political parties, units
' and it stated its views
of government and all other organizations,"258
in easily understood terms:
1.It is illegal to condition humanitarian assistance on where a person
chooses to vote.
2. It is illegal to require citizens to produce voter registration forms for
any purpose that may have the effect of disadvantaging them.
3. The Sub-Commission views any such activity as extremely serious, and
will deal with violations with the utmost severity.259
Subsequently, two decisions were issued in specific cases. In one

of the cases, the Sub-Commission explained the use of the advisory
opinion form:
Indeed it was in response to these scattered reports that the SubCommission issued its first advisory opinion. The Sub-Commission
believes it is important to remind people that it is constituted as a juridical
body. When it makes findings of fact, it must collect and evaluate
evidence. In determining legal responsibility for violations of law and
assessing penalties for such violations, it must first satisfy itself that there
is sufficient evidence supporting its decisions. This process takes time. In
the case of this "linkage" issue, the Sub-Commission realized the
importance of issuing a public declaration quickly in an
260 attempt to
prevent or correct violations that it had not yet investigated.
The Sub-Commission principally relied on Article IV of Annex 3
to the Dayton Agreement in its three rulings on the issue of voter
choice:
A citizen who no longer lives in the municipality in which he or she
resided in 1991 shall, as a general rule, be expected to vote, in person, or
by absentee ballot, in that municipality ....A citizen may, however,
261
apply to the Commission to cast his or her ballot elsewhere ....
In implementing the above provision, the PEC created a system

258. Id.
259. Id.

260. See, e.g., Case No. 96-9B, supranote 240.
261. Dayton Agreement, supra note 8, annex 3, art. IV (emphasis added).
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whereby displaced persons could register to vote in the communities
where they had moved. 62 The general rule reflected the Dayton
Agreement's goal to reintegrate Bosnian society by encouraging
those displaced by the war to return home. It is complementary to
Annex 7 of the General Framework Agreement, entitled "Agreement
on Refugees and Displaced Persons.,2 63 Article I.1 provides, in part:
"All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to
their homes of origin."' Exceptions to the general rule reflected the
reality that many people either could not or would not return to areas
from which they had been "cleansed." In any case, the exceptions
were not intended as tools to consolidate the fruits of ethnic
cleansing. The right to choose where to vote and where to live was
that of the individual citizen.265
In dealing with this issue, the Sub-Commission looked to the
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,26 which is replete with
human rights guarantees. 21 In one of its rulings, the SubCommission observed:
These Rules and Regulations did not in any way contemplate that PEC

voter registration forms would be used to deny benefits to displaced
persons in order to advance the divisive political aims of those who want
to permanently divide the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina into ethnic
enclaves. This subverts the letter and the spirit of the Dayton Agreement
and the Rules and Regulations. It also offends even the dullest of human
rights' sensibilities.268

As previously noted, the Sub-Commission issued the advisory
opinion to help put an end to a serious violation of the law that had
profound consequences for the election.269 There is some evidence,

262. See PEC Rules, supra note 124, arts. 5-14, 16 (discussing how displaced
persons could vote in the communities where they resided during the election).

263. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 8, annex 7 (providing guidelines for the
voting rights of refugees and displaced persons).

264. Id art. 1.1.
265. See id annex 3, art. IV (discussing where a voter may cast a ballot).
266. See id annex 4.
267. See id art. I. Article II of the Constitution is dedicated to Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms. Annex I of the Constitution lists 15 additional human
rights agreements to be applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
268. Case No. 96-9B, supra note 240, at 8.
269. See supra notes 260-66 and accompanying text (explaining how the Sub-
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mostly anecdotal, that the opinion had some deterrent effect. OSCE
human rights monitors widely distributed the opinion throughout
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reported that the practice stopped.
Unfortunately, however, the opinion came late in the registration
process after much of the pressure had presumably been applied."'
Indeed, overall problems with the exceptions to the general rule were
cited as the principal reason why municipal elections were ultimately
postponed."'
In the advisory opinion, the Sub-Commission vowed to treat
violations with the utmost severity. 2 Subsequently, the SubCommission imposed penalties in two concrete cases.2 73 One
investigation found that the local Serb Democratic Party ("SDS")
Commission on Refugees and Displaced Persons had made formal
written proposals to the Doboj Municipal Assembly to withhold
housing assistance from displaced persons who did not present proof
that they intended to vote in the Doboj Municipality.274 Another
proposal was to direct all government and municipal bodies to
condition their services on presentation of the PEC form indicating
2
an intent to vote in the municipality. "
The Municipal Assembly adopted these proposals,276 but there was
no evidence that they were ever implemented. 7 As noted in the
decision, it appears that the outcry from the international community
upon discovering these actions forced local officials to abandon the
policy. 27 Nonetheless, the Sub-Commission decided to punish the
SDS for this activity. The Sub-Commission imposed a civil penalty
withholding the SDS's entitlement to campaign funds financed and
administered by the OSCE.2 79 Local SDS officials were also required
to make a public apology, written by the Sub-Commission, which
Commission intended the opinion to halt violation of the law).
270. Voter registration ended on July 31, 1996.
271. See Pomfret, supra note 127, at Al (discussing the delay in voting due to
"widespread electoral fraud").

272. See Advisory Opinion 1, supranote 245.
273. See, e.g., Case No. 96-9B, supranote 240.
274.
275.
276.
277.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

278. See Case No. 96-9B, supra note 240.
279. See id.
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was to be broadcast on radio and television by a certain date. 2S) In the
event that the apology was not made by the deadline, the SubCommission would begin removing the names of two candidates per
day from the SDS party list for municipal elections in Doboj until the
SDS made the apology. 2 1' The threat of removal of candidate names
from the party list proved a sufficient inducement. 2v " The SDS made
the apology by the deadline.283
This case received considerable attention in the local and
international press. One report noted that "[t]he public apology,
prompted by the OSCE ruling, was an extraordinary departure from
the party's customary bombast and isolationist rhetoric. ' '2m A
newspaper reported that Momcilo Krajisnik, who would be elected to
the Serb seat on the three-member Presidency on September 14th,
called the Sub-Commission's decision "blackmail." 285
In a related case in the nearby municipality of Modrica, 2"6 the SubCommission found that the local election commission violated PEC
rules by denying 59 displaced persons the right to freely choose
where to vote.2" The investigation disclosed that local election
commission officials simply filled out the pertinent forms,
precluding the displaced persons from voting in their former
homes. 211 The Sub-Commission ordered the immediate removal of
the Chairman of the local commission.2 9 Since specific victims were
identified, the Sub-Commission recommended to the PEC that the
victims be given the opportunity to re-register to vote by absentee
ballot in their former domiciles. 290 The PEC agreed; all but a handful

280. See id

281. See id
282. See Dan DeLuce, Bosnian Serbs Apologise for Voter Manipulation,
REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Aug. 17, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
283. See Case No. 96-9B, supra note 240.
284. DeLuce, supranote 282.
285. See KrajisnikProtests OSCE Finefor SDS, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Aug.
16, 1996, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.

286. See Actions of the Local Election Commission of the Municipality of
Modrica, Case No. 96-1 ID, 2 Bilten 43 (1996) [hereinafter Case No. 96-1 ID]

287.
288.
289.
290.

See id
See id.
See id at 44.
See id
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took advantage of this choice-a choice that they should have been
given in the first instance.
The Sub-Commission also recommended that the PEC consider a
general remedy for all displaced persons who could prove they were
denied the choice of where to vote despite the fact that voter
registration was over. 29 ' The PEC declined to act on this
recommendation.
3. Instances of Violence and Intimidation
The Sub-Commission's punishment in the Silajdic case did not put
an end to all campaign violence. In response to reports of violent acts
committed in Una Sana Canton, where the Silajdic attack had
occurred in June,292 the Sub-Commission issued an advisory
opinion.293 This area was considered one of the "hot spots" within the
Federation. 294 During the war, a local Muslim and his supporters had
sided with ethnic Serbs in the fighting, and the bitterness ran deep.
The violence here was Muslim-on-Muslim. In August, members of
the international community had visited the area in an effort to calm
the situation.29 OSCE's Deputy Director for Human Rights and the
Sub-Commission's Chairman were among those visitors."' Also in
attendance were the High Representative for Civilian Implementation
under Dayton,
Carl Bildt, and Commissioner Fitzgerald of the
7
IPTF.

29

The Sub-Commission's mandate was to enforce electoral laws.2 9
In order to do this, the Sub-Commission was given limited
enforcement tools to use on candidates and political parties.2 99 It
could not, however, police every instance of violence--even if that

291. See Case No. 96-1 ID, supra note 286, at 44.
292. See In the Matter of Complaints Against the Party of Democratic Action in
the Una Sana Canton, Case No. 96-20B, 2 Bilten 63 (1996) [hereinafter Case No.
96-20B].
293. See Advisory Opinion 3 (Violence and Intimidation), Aug. 27, 1996, 2
Bilten 67 [hereinafter Advisory Opinion 3].
294. See Case No. 96-20B, supranote 292, at 63-64.
295. See id. at 64.

296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See PEC Rules, supranote 124, pt. VIII, art. 138.

299. See id.arts. 140-41.
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violence was politically motivated. It had neither the authority nor
the resources needed for such a job. Even IFOR, with 60,000 troops
and enormous firepower, was not expected to stop this type of
violence. Nonetheless the Sub-Commission was persuaded to act."
It first issued an advisory opinion that reminded political parties and
candidates of their responsibilities under the Electoral Code of
Conduct for the violent activities of their supporters."' In so doing,
the Sub-Commission distinguished its role from that of the criminal
justice system:
The Sub-Commission wishes to make clear that it has neither the
authority nor the ability to determine criminal responsibility for acts of
violence and intimidation. The workings of the Sub-Commission are

entirely separate and distinct from those of the criminal justice system:
the standards of proof are different, the range of available penalties are
different, and indeed the purposes are different. Whereas the criminal
justice system is charged with, among other matters, the identification,
punishment and rehabilitation of individual culprits, the Sub-Commission
aims, through fair and impartial enforcement of the electoral laws, rules
and regulations, to promote the conditions necessary for the conduct of
free and fair elections. 0 2

The opinion noted that a political party would be punished where
there was credible evidence of direct involvement in acts of
intimidation or violence.3 3 It also placed an affirmative burden on
political parties to take steps to limit acts of violence and
intimidation undertaken by its supporters.3 0 The advisory opinion
informed political parties of the following obligations:
i) to instruct... members and supporters, including [their] youth wing
and other affiliated bodies, that such actions will not be tolerated;

ii) to instruct.. . members that they must, under pain of party discipline,
come forward with any information in their possession that could help
identify the perpetrators; and

iii) to remove from any position of party influence any person found to
300. See Advisory Opinion 3, supra note 293, at 67.
301. See id
302. Id
303. Seeid at68.
304. See id
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305
have participated in, approved or acquiesced in such acts.

The week following the issuance of the advisory opinion, the SubCommission decided to take specific action against the ruling party
with respect to violence in Una Sana Canton.306 It noted that there
had been 25 reports of violence, intimidation, and harassment in this
area between July 1st and August 20th, including ten bombings,
three shootings, and nine beatings by the local police.30 7 It also noted
that the SDA controlled the authorities responsible for keeping the
peace and investigating the criminal acts.30 8 In ruling that these
politically motivated acts violated the Dayton Agreement and the
Electoral Code of Conduct, the Sub-Commission found that the SDA
was in a position to have prevented much of the violence.30 9 As a
result, the SDA was required to pay a civil penalty of $25,000, which
was to be withheld from its entitlement to campaign funds, and to
make a public statement, written by the Sub-Commission, on
television and radio within the week. The public statement included
the following points: (a) condemning the actions; (b) cautioning
SDA workers and supporters from engaging in criminal acts of
violence, intimidation, and harassment; (c) calling upon local police
to conduct vigorous investigations; (d) pledging to assist the police in
their investigations; (e) announcing the recent replacement of the
Police Chief in Cazin;310 (f) informing voters that their votes would
be secret; and (g) pledging that the SDA would cooperate fully in
assuring that the elections are free and fair.3 '
The decision warned that the failure to make the public statement

305. Advisory Opinion 3, supra note 293, at 68.

306. See Complaints Against SDA in Una Sana Canton for Acts of Violence and
Intimidation, Case No. 96-20B, 3 Bilten 63 (1996) [hereinafter Case No. 96-20B].
307. See id at 63-64. No deaths were reported. The decision also noted that
since August 20th, the violence in the area had subsided, citing efforts of the
international community and the Minister of the Interior of the Federation, Avdo
Hebib. See id Minister Hebib demonstrated a commitment to working for free and

fair elections, cooperated with the Sub-Commission in conducting investigations,
and used his influence to make the police forces within the Federation professional
and responsive. See id

308. See id. at 64.
309. See id.
310. Minister Hebib had forced the removal of the police chief in the
municipality where much of the violence had occurred. See id. at 65.
311. See id
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as directed would result in the removal of one name per day from the
party list of SDA candidates for the cantonal elections in Una Sana
for each day of non-compliance.312 The SDA complied.
In considering this case, the Sub-Commission had a choice. It
could either wring its hands and declare its inability to "prove" the
facts of each instance of violence, or it could place responsibility on
the governing party of the canton that has an affirmative obligation to
prevent the violence directed at the political opposition. It chose the
latter, seeing a need to take action against the climate of fear and
violence that had taken hold of this part of the Federation."'
On the same day, the Sub-Commission issued a decision involving
the disruption of political rallies held by the Joint List, a multi-ethnic
coalition active in elections throughout both entities.3"4 The
disruptions occurred in the municipalities of Gradacac and Srebrenik,
located in the Federation. SDA supporters caused the disruptions."'
The Gradacae rally took place on August 13th.31 6 Local police, who
later aided the Sub-Commission's investigation, arrested a number of
individuals involved in the disruption.1 7 According to witnesses,
fifteen or twenty young men wearing SDA T-shirts positioned
themselves in front of the podium and prevented the speakers from
giving their speeches. 318 Eventually, the men took over the stage and
the microphones and played music. 319 What had begun as a rally for
an opposition political group turned into an impromptu street party
for supporters of the ruling political party.320 Several of those
detained by police gave statements that shed some light on their
democratic sensibilities and illustrated precisely the type of conduct
proscribed by the Electoral Code of Conduct. 32 ' The following
312. See id
313. See Advisory Opinion 3, supra note 293, at 67-68.
314. See Disruption by SDA Supporters of Rallies Held by the Joint List in
Gradacac and Srebrenik, Case Nos. 96-13D/96-15D, 3 Bilten 87 (1996)

[hereinafter Case Nos. 96-13D/96-15D].
315. See id at 87-88.
316. Seeid at87.
317. Seeid at88.
318. See id at 87.

319. See Case Nos. 96-13D/96-15D, supra note 314, at 88.
320. See id

321. See PEC Rules, supra note 124, pt. VII, art. 122 (specifically prohibiting
the disruption of public political meetings).
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passage from the decision describes the self-incriminating statements
made by two of the individuals detained by police:
Omer Hecimovic, President of MOS 322 Gradacac and a candidate in the
municipal elections, attended the rally. He claims to have been irritated
by the contents of the speeches, and reports joining in shouting down the
Joint List speakers. He also reports that the crowd shouted: "Alija, Alija,"
"Alah Ekber, '323 and "SDA, SDA." Despite his position of leadership
within the MOS, he made no effort to quiet the hecklers or stop the
disruptions. Disturbingly, he also admits that he and a group of associates
"followed" a few paces behind the rally speakers and organizers as they
departed the rally site.
Elmir Tukic is President of the Pozarike local branch of MOS Gradacac.
He admits to arriving at the meeting attired in an SDA T-shirt and
carrying a megaphone. He claims that he and a group of his associates did
not like the contents of the speeches, so [they] "whistled" each of the
speakers off the stage. After the rally was broken-up as a result of the
rowdiness, he went with a group to the local SDA headquarters, where
they obtained SDA flags and pictures of President Izetbegovic. They then
paraded back to the rally site where they chanted slogans such as "Alija,
Alija," "Alah Ekber," and "SDA, SDA."

One of the young men participating in the rally turned out to be a
candidate on the SDA's list for municipal elections in Gradacac.325
The Sub-Commission ordered the removal of his name from the list
and terminated his candidacy. 26
On the day following the Gradacac incident, SDA supporters
attempted a similar disruption of a rally in Srebrenik.3 27 This time the
police were prepared for the disturbance. They promptly removed the
troublemakers from the rally site.328 In contrast to Gradacac, the rally
was not cut short. 329 After its conclusion, police changed the bus
route for Joint List candidates and officials, thus heading off any

322. Muslim Youth Council ("MOS") is the youth wing of the SDA.
323. "Alija" is a reference to President Izetbegovic. "Alah Ekber" means "God
is Great."
324. Case Nos. 96-13D/96-15D, supra note 314, at 88.
325. See id.

326. See id.at 90.
327. See id.at 89.
328. See id.

329. See Case Nos. 96-13D/96-15D, supra note 314, at 89.
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planned violence."' In the decision, the Sub-Commission praised the
" ' The decision also reported the
actions of the police in Srebrenik.33
public reaction of President Alija Izetbegovic and the subsequent
actions of the Gradacac police:
On 16 August, Alija Izetbegovic, President of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and also of the SDA, issued a statement in which he deplored the
disruptions of the Joint List rallies and expressed his "deepest
disapprobation". He stated that he had "fought for a Bosnia in which
people could think and speak freely" and called upon his supporters not to
attach his name to similar incidents.
A few days thereafter, the Police Chief of Gradacac told OSCE staff that
the Ministry of the Interior had instructed him to make full security plans
for all political rallies in the future, which the Ministry would have to
review and approve in advance. He repeated several times that he alone
bore responsibility for the disruption of the Gradacac rally, and that he
had not ordered his officers to break up the hecklers because they did not
have riot control gear or correct training. He stated that President
332
Izetbegovic's condemnation of the disturbances "meant a lot" to him.

For the most part, campaign activity throughout Bosnia and
Herzegovina was robust. 333 Disruptions of rallies were the exception
to the rule.3 34 While it is difficult to evaluate, it can be argued that the
Sub-Commission played a positive role in this state of relative
openness.335

330.
331.
332.
333.

See id
See id
Id
See Sir Kenneth Scott, 'Free and Fair' Vote in Bosnia Elections, THE
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
334. See id
335. The relatively low levels of violence throughout the country must be
viewed in the context that the country had effectively been partitioned during the
war. Therefore, major populations of rival ethnic groups were not in the type of
close contact that could have led to worse conflict. See discussion, supra pt. V.B.
Clearly the presence of IFOR and the IPTF helped immensely in reducing the
potential for violence. Given the savagery of the war, however, it is notable that
the violence was not more pronounced. This stands in contrast to the significant
violence in Cambodia in the 1993 elections held under the authority of the United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia ("UNTAC") where even UNTAC
electoral personnel were killed. See Two UNTAC Electoral Workers Die in Attack,
ELECTORAL COMPONENT NEWSLETrER (UNTAC), Jan. 15, 1993, at 17. Nothing
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The Sub-Commission also took some tentative steps with respect
to politically motivated job dismissals and other forms of
employment-related intimidation.336 It had received complaints from
an opposition party in Republika Srpska that municipal authorities
dominated by the ruling SDS had removed individuals from jobs
because of their political activity. In this area, the Sub-Commission's
positive influence is questionable.
First.It was clear that it lacked the resources necessary to conduct
the type of investigation necessary to make credible findings in such
multifaceted and complex cases.
Second. The court system of Republika Srpska already was
reviewing a number of these dismissals. These cases involved issues
quite apart from electoral rules.
Third. The Sub-Commission's jurisdiction extended only through
the elections. Once they were held, any rulings would lack force.
Thus, an individual might be able to avoid a politically-motivated
dismissal until the election was over.
Nonetheless, the Sub-Commission issued an advisory opinion on
August 23rd putting "all parties, candidates and their supporters on
notice that we take very seriously allegations of politically motivated
dismissals and other job-related harassment committed during or
shortly proceeding the campaign period. '337 Copies of the opinion
were sent to the municipalities charged in the complaints. On
September 2nd, the Sub-Commission was informed that two of the
individuals named in the complaints had been reinstated by the
government, which had finally decided to comply with a ruling to
that effect by the Supreme Court of Republika Srpska. The SubCommission's investigations were "continued." It is fair to say that
the Sub-Commission's influence in this area has been negligible at
best. It is possible to conceive, however, of a straightforward case
that would violate the Dayton Agreement and the Electoral Code of
Conduct. For the elections of September 14th, no such case was
presented.

comparable occurred in Bosnia.

336. See Advisory Opinion 2, Job Dismissals and Other Forms of EmploymentRelated Intimidation, 2 Bilten 59 [hereinafter Advisory Opinion 2].
337. Id.
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4. Secessionism, Secessionist Speech, and Freedom of F-pression
One of the most interesting questions addressed by the SubCommission involved secessionism and ethnic nationalism. Indeed,
the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the bloody conflicts
that followed were the fruits of this phenomenon. 38 The resurgence
of secessionism and ethnic nationalism during the campaign placed
the Sub-Commission in the position of balancing the value of
freedom of expression with the commitment to the sovereignty of
Bosnia and Herzegovina required by the Dayton Agreement.
Three rulings late in the campaign addressed this balance. Early
on, however, the question of secessionism had arisen in the context
of political parties' rights to field candidates in both Entities. In July,
the government of Republika Srpska filed a complaint challenging
the application of the PEC's Rules and Regulations which permitted
parties based in the Federation Entity to present candidates for
election to political office within the Republika Srpska Entity.339 The
new Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina" allocated various
responsibilities between the Entities and the country as a whole." It
was inevitable that the ambiguous nature of this allocation would
present problems down the road. The government of Republika
Srpska essentially took the position that only it had the competence
to determine political party and candidate eligibility for elective
positions to be filled from within the Entity. It cited Republika
Srpska law as precluding Federation political parties from
participating in elections within the Entity. 2 PEC rules were not
extensive on candidate qualifications?43 Articles 15 and 56 of the
PEC Rules simply repeated Article IX of the Constitution in
precluding persons either indicted or convicted of war crimes from
holding elective office:

338. See SILBER& LITTLE, supranote 50.
339. See Complaint by the Government of Republika Srpska Regarding
Application of PEC Rules and Regulations, Case No. 96-4B, I Bilten 29 (July 26,
1996) [hereinafter Case No. 96-4B].
340. See Dayton Agreement, supra note 8, annex 4
341. See id art. m (explaining "Responsibilities of and Relations Between the
Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities").
342. See Case No. 96-4B, supra note 339.
343. See PECRules, supranote 124, arts. 15, 56.
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No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the International

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and no person who is under
indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed to comply with an order to
appear before the Tribunal, may stand as a candidate or hold any
appointive, elective
or other public office in the territory of Bosnia and
3 44
Herzegovina.

Beyond this proscription, PEC Rules and Regulations on candidate
eligibility were largely technical in nature. None, however, limited
party or candidate participation across Entity boundaries.34 5 The Sub-

Commission concluded that there was no basis in law to limit
participation across Entity borders by analogizing voter eligibility
provisions in both the Dayton Agreement and the Rules and
Regulations to candidate eligibility. 346 The decision cited Article III
of Annex 3 to the Dayton Agreement, which required compliance
with any rules and regulations to be adopted by the PEC,
notwithstanding any internal laws or regulations, 347 and reasoned that
"PEC Rules and Regulations occupy the field" on such issues.3 48 In
its dismissal, the Sub-Commission specifically rejected the
complaint's implicit argument in favor of "total ethnic separation
in
349
the electoral context among Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs.
This dry and technical decision was followed by three rulings
made in a crisis atmosphere late in the campaign.350 In these rulings,
the Sub-Commission noted that the right to freedom of expression
was fundamental, but not absolute.35' Previously, the SubCommission had considered two complaints concerning highly
offensive statements made about two candidates.352 In both cases, the
complaints were dismissed on the grounds that the speech was
protected.353 In Advisory Opinion No. 5, the Sub-Commission
attempted to blunt the negative effect of increasingly strident rhetoric

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id.art. 15.
See id.arts. 54-56.
See Case No.96-4B, supra note 339.
See id.
Id.
Case No. 96-4B, supra note 339.
See Report to Head of Mission, supra note 31, at 15.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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by major candidates calling "for independence and territorial
separation of part of the country, or [referring] to part of the country
as a sovereign territory."" 4
The Sub-Commission designed the opinion as a warning to all
candidates and party officials, but it was primarily a response to
speeches made by SDS candidates in Republika Srpska.3 5 It did not
directly address specific statements alleged to have been made, nor
did it single out any individual party, ethnic group, or individual." 6
At this point in the process, the Sub-Commission had become better
known and generally respected due to the dissemination of its
decisions. The Sub-Commission hoped that the opinion would
persuade people to tone down their rhetoric, as the time drew nearer
for the vote. Given the history of the past few years, there was
concern that such rhetoric could lead to substantial violence on the
eve of the elections.157 The opinion can be divided into three parts:
(1) the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and
Herzegovina as set forth in the General Framework Agreement and
in the Constitution at Annex 4;358 (2) the obligations undertaken by
political parties and candidates to abide by the Dayton Agreement as
set forth in Annex 3 and in PEC Rules and Regulations;... and (3)
freedom of expression as a core democratic value that is subject to
limitations.360
The opinion first pointed to Article I of the General Framework
Agreement itself, which committed the Parties "to conduct their
relations in accordance with the principles set forth in the United
Nations Charter. 361 It specifically drew attention to the commitment
to "fully respect the sovereign equality of one another ... and [to]
refrain from any action, by threat or use of force or otherwise, against
the territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and

354. Advisory Opinion 5, Statements that Advocate Sovereignty for a Part of
the Country or that Otherwise Threaten its Territorial Integrity, 3 Bilten 103
[hereinafter Advisory Opinion 5].
355. See id
356. See id at 104-05.
357. See id at 104.
358. See id
359. See Advisory Opinion 5, supra note 354, at 103.

360. See id at 104.
361. Dayton Agreement, supra note 8, art. 1.
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' Next, the opinion considered
Herzegovina or any other State."362
Article 1.1 of the Constitution, providing that Bosnia and
Herzegovina "shall continue its legal existence as a state, with its
internal structure modified as provided herein and with its present
internationally recognized borders."36' 3 Article 1.3 details the
modifications to the state's internal structure, providing that Bosnia
and Herzegovina would consist of two Entities.3' 6 In this part of the
decision, the opinion concluded:

It is thus not open to doubt that Bosnia and Herzegovina exists as a
sovereign state within its recognized international boundaries, and that
Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the
constituent entities of that sovereign state, having no separate existence
under international law. Indeed, the express right of each of the entities to
establish special parallel relationships with neighboring states is subject to
the condition that such arrangements be "consistent with the sovereign
and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (Constitution, Article
III, 2(a)). The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina is
specifically empowered to decide questions as to whether any such
and territorial integrity of the
special relationships violate the sovereignty
365
state (Constitution, Article VI, 3(a)).

The second part of the opinion noted that Article 46 of the PEC
Rules and Regulations conditioned political party and candidate
participation in the elections on their agreement to "abide by the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and
Candidates, and the Rules and Regulations approved by the
Provisional Election Commission. ' 66
In the third part of the opinion, the Sub-Commission tackled its
most difficult legal issue, freedom of expression and its limits. It
noted the following provision in the Constitution:
International Standards. The rights and freedoms set forth in the

362.
363.
364.
365.

ld
Advisory Opinion 5, supra note 354, at 103.
See id.
Id

366. ld Consistent with this provision, the President or Vice President of each
party participating in the elections filed a statement agreeing to these terms when it
applied for registration to the Provisional Election Commission. See id.
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly367in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. These shall have priority over all other law.

The opinion placed particular emphasis on Article 10 of the
Convention dealing with freedom of expression. 36s Article 10 (1)
provides: "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and
impart information and ideas without interference. ... ,3' The SubCommission noted, however, that this right is subject to limits:
While the right to freedom of expression is fundamental, it is not
absolute. Article 10 (2) of the European Convention permits restrictions
on the right, but only such as "are prescribed by law and are necessary in
a democratic society" to protect various enumerated interests, including
"national security, territorial integrity or public safety, and the prevention
of disorder or crime. 37

The opinion noted that the balancing of these complementary
provisions must be accomplished in a real-world context:
Not all statements which call for a re-examination of territorial borders
fall outside the protection of freedom of expression. Each statement must
be examined within the context in which it is made to evaluate whether it
poses a genuine and imminent threat to national security, territorial
integrity or public order. A statement made in an academic journal or to
an audience in a stable democracy, however offensive, may pose little
likelihood of motivating unlawful action, whereas the same statement
made in the context of the first election campaign following a war
characterized by ethnic cleansing may well pose a genuine
and imminent
37 1
threat to territorial integrity as well as to public order.

Finally, the opinion balanced these provisions in the context of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the waning days of the campaign:
The Sub-Commission views very seriously statements made by
candidates, party leaders or public officials that call into question the

367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

Id at 104.
See Advisory Opinion 5, supranote 354, at 103.
Id
Id
Id
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territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as agreed at Dayton.
Statements of personal preference are tolerable, but where candidates or
party officials appeal to voters to reject the basic principles of the entire
peace process, their words could well lead to violence or other unlawful
action. It is not possible to vote changes to the territorial integrity of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The international community is committed to
preserving the country's territorial integrity. Many of the people to whom
these inflammatory statements are directed have weapons; many have
fought for territorial separation in the past. In this context, statements
rejecting the country's integration made by candidates and high ranking
party officials could well pose a genuine threat to the country's territorial
integrity or to public order.
Various circumstances may increase the seriousness of a statement's
threat: whether the language appeals to emotion or reflexive nationalism,
rather than reason; whether the statement is made on television or radio,
particularly if state-run, or to a large public audience, rather than in print;
whether the person making the statements is armed or flanked by symbols
or other paraphernalia suggesting the willingness to use violence; or
whether the speaker is a high-ranking official. If any of these
circumstances is present, 72the Sub-Commission will devote particular
attention to the statement.1

In an extraordinary departure from its normal practice,3 73 the SubCommission called a press conference in Pale, the capital of
Republika Srpska, to deliver the opinion eight days prior to the
elections.3 74 The Chairman, flanked by his Bosniac, Croat, and Serb
colleagues, read the opinion aloud in its entirety. The SubCommission hoped that this public display of unity would put an end
to the offending rhetoric. 3 " It did not.
Four days before the election, the Sub-Commission issued a
decision based on several complaints involving the SDS. From its
review, the Sub-Commission concluded that the "tenor and content
of the SDS campaign is in breach of the General Framework
Agreement and the Rules and Regulations of the PEC.9) 376 The
decision required the SDS to pay a civil penalty of $50,000 and
372. Id.
373. See discussion, supra pt. V.D. The Sub-Commission had never before
indicated the votes of particular members and had issued its decisions and opinions
with the name of its international chairman only.
374. See Wilkinson, supranote 25, at Al.
375. See id
376. Id. at 120.
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ordered SDS candidates and officials to "refrain from any further
statements which challenge in any way the integrity of Bosnia and
Herzegovina or which assert the independence of Republika
Srpska." 3" The Sub-Commission warned that it would continue to
review statements and that offending candidates could be removed
from party lists.37 Fundamental to the decision were SDS control of
Radio and Television Srpska379 and the lack of independent media in
Republika Srpska to provide opposing views."' The decision noted
that Srpska Television, despite its presence there, had failed to report
on the Sub-Commission's press conference in Republika Srpska in
which it first published its advisory opinion on secessionist speech.3"'
In the days following the issuance of this decision, the SubCommission continued to monitor the situation.3" It reviewed
videotapes and written materials and concluded that it would have to
revisit the issue one last time.3s It did so on September 13th, the day
before the election, finding that "the tone and tenor of the SDS
campaign continue to violate the General Framework Agreement and
Regulations of the Provisional Election
the Rules and
314
Commission.
The pressure on the Sub-Commission was intense. In the advisory
opinion, it had hoped to persuade the SDS from continuing its
secessionist rhetoric, but it had come up short.385 In the subsequent
decision, the Sub-Commission utilized a civil penalty and warning so
as not to risk a backlash by immediately terminating the candidacies
of major SDS figures with only a few days until the election. 3 6 This
did not work.
Biljana Plavsic, the successor to Radovan Karadzic as President of
Republika Srpska and the SDS candidate for that position in the

377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

Id.
See id
See id
See id
See id

382. See Tenor and Content of the SDS Campaign, Case No. 96-34B, 3 Bilten
147 (Sept. 13, 1996) [hereinafter Case No. 96-34B].
383. See id
384. Id

385. See Advisory Opinion 5, supra note 354, at 103.
386. See Case No. 96-34B, supra note 382, at 147.
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election, was arguably the greatest offender." 7 Karadzic, indicted by
the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,388 was forced
by the international community to leave the Presidency in favor of
Madame Plavsic and ultimately was forced to resign from the
leadership of the SDS.3" 9 He had become a martyr in much of
Republika Srpska, a symbol of resistance to the international
community's "bias" against Bosnian Serbs.39 Madame Plavsic
continued her secessionist speech after the issuance of both the
advisory opinion and the first decision regarding the SDS.3 9' What
would the effect be if her candidacy for President of Republika
Srpska were terminated just hours before the election? Would SDS
supporters be disenfranchised with respect to that office? Would
there be a boycott of the elections? Would there be violence? Would
the Provisional Election Commission reverse the Sub-Commission?
In short, would the decision bring chaos to an election day that had
been in planning for nine months? In fashioning an appropriate

387. See id at 147-48.
388. See Complaint Against the SDS, Case No. 96-2B, 1 Bilten 25 (1996)
[hereinafter Case No 96-2B].
389. On July 2nd, a complaint was filed with the Sub-Commission arguing that
the Dayton Agreement precluded Karadzic from holding political party office. (He
had previously stepped down from the Presidency of Republika Srpska, at least
officially). The complaint sought to ban the SDS from the elections on the basis of
Karadzic's continued political involvement. During this same period, the Head of
the OSCE Mission had taken the position that the SDS could not participate in the
elections if Karadzic remained its President. It was an extraordinarily difficult
legal question with enormous consequences for the effective functioning of the
Sub-Commission whose members were just beginning to form a collegial working
relationship. The Sub-Commission was scheduled to consider the matter at a
meeting on July 19th. Before the meeting, it was announced that Richard Holbrook
had brokered an agreement with President Milosevic for Karadzic to resign his
party office and to unequivocally relinquish all political activity. See Steven
Erlanger, The World; A Bosnian Sort of Victory, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1996, at 4,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Given the supervening events,
the Sub-Commission was able to dismiss the matter without prejudice. See Case
No. 96-2B, supra note 388, at 25.
390. One manifestation of that resistance was the display of Karadzic posters at
SDS rallies and on public buildings throughout Republika Srpska during the
campaign. The posters had become a huge issue in the waning days of the
campaign. See Karadzic Posters, Case No. 96-29B, 3 Bilten 127 [hereinafter 9629B]; Christine Spolar, Election Panel Fines Bosnian Serb Ruling Party, WASH.
POST, Sept. 11, 1996, at A17.
391. See Case 96-34B, supranote 382, at 147.
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response, the Sub-Commission and its staff had to take into account
all these considerations.
Drawing lines between permissible and impermissible speech in
an electoral context is a difficult legal challenge. The SubCommission faced an even greater challenge in deciding what it
could do about the continuing violations. 392 As noted earlier, the SubCommission had made its decisions with an eye toward political
reality and with the OSCE objective that the elections go forward.
Up until now, it had been relatively successful in achieving the
balance required. Less than 24 hours remained before the polls would
open. The Sub-Commission decision read, in part, as follows:
Freedom of expression is one of the essential foundations of a democratic

society. The Sub-Commission does not take lightly its responsibility to
determine when political speech which is entitled to protection crosses the

line and becomes advocacy of lawless action which threatens the
constitutional order. After having completed its review of the video

recordings and other statements at its meeting this morning, the SubCommission has no doubt that statements made at the SDS rally in Banja
Luka crossed that line. These statements clearly represent an immediate
threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Many of the people at the Banja Luka rally have fought for
territorial separation in the past and many have lost loved ones in that
fight. It is hardly idle speculation to suppose that the oratory of today,
which flouts the international community as dangerously as it challenges
the constitutional foundation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, could lead to

violence in the near future. If the SDS is allowed to make these
statements with impunity, after having received such a clear warning of
the consequences, the unmistakable message that is sent to SDS
supporters throughout Republika Srpska, is that 393
they can act in
equal impunity.

accordance with these statements, with

The decision required Dr. Plavsic to make an apology on Srpska
Television during the evening news and to have the statement
repeated twice more before 11:00 p.m. 394 The Sub-Commission wrote
the statement and warned Dr. Plavsic not to deviate from it in any
way.395 It further prohibited Dr. Plavsic, or any SDS official, from

392.
393.
394.
395.

See id.
Id
See id
See id at 148.
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making any statements before or after the apology. The SubCommission tried to ensure her compliance by stating:
If there is delay in making the statement, or if the presentation of the
statement in any way seeks to change or disown its content, three of the
first five candidates will be removed from the SDS Party list for the
the Republika Srpska, and their
elections to the National Assembly of 396
candidacies for public office terminated.

This group of five candidates included some powerful members of
the SDS leadership. The decision and apology were hand-delivered
to Dr. Plavsic's secretary in Pale on Friday afternoon. She complied
with the terms of the decision by delivering the following message
that evening in Serbian:
The SDS sincerely apologizes for statements made during the election
campaign, including my own statements, which appear to question the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The SDS
deeply regrets any statements which have suggested that Republika
Srpska is an independent state. The SDS wishes to make clear to its
supporters and the people of Republika Srpska that it is fully committed
to implementing the Dayton Agreement. It is not the aim of the SDS, now
or in the future, to unify all Serbs in the Balkans into one joint state. SDS
candidates from Republika Srpska, if elected, are committed to joining
and working with elected officials from the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the common institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
future of Republika Srpska is within the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
All SDS candidates, if elected, will work to preserve the unity of Bosnia
and Herzegovina as an independent state and as a society dedicated to
peace, justice, tolerance and reconciliation. The SDS will work for a
Bosnia and Herzegovina in which
Serbs, Croats and Muslims can live
397
dignity.
and
peace
in
together

It is difficult to gauge the impact of this statement on the election
and the peace process. Certainly few could believe that Dr. Plavsic
and the SDS had suddenly abandoned Serb nationalism. Nonetheless,
a high ranking and popular public official from Republika Srpska
made a very public apology for the secessionist speech that had
overtaken the SDS campaign and publicly acknowledged the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
396. Case 96-34B, supra note 382, at 148.
397. Id.
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the authority of the OSCE.3 98 The statement brought a peaceful
closure to a situation threatening to spin out of control in the final
days of the campaign.399 The following day, Dr. Plavsic was elected
President of Republika Srpska.
It is significant that the Sub-Commission, in neither the advisory
opinion nor in the related decisions that followed, did not find that
specific words were in violation of the Dayton Agreement or the
PEC Rules and Regulations. Instead, it took the position that the
"general tenor and content" of the SDS campaign constituted the
violation.4°° It is also significant that the Sub-Commission's rulings
were delivered in the rough and tumble of real life with real
consequences. Whatever their long-term impact on ethnic
nationalism and the preservation of the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the rulings demonstrated that international
commitments cannot be conveniently discarded and that words have
meaning.
5. Misfeasance or Malfeasance on the Partof Local Officials, Police,
andParties
In addition to some of the matters described above, the SubCommission addressed other violations by local officials and party
members prior to the elections. These included the illegal
involvement of a political party in voter registration,"' voter
registration fraud,40 2 the obstruction of OSCE voter education

efforts, 4 3 and the confiscation of opposition campaign materials by
police. 4" Four of these cases are described below. In the first three,
398. See id (noting that Dr. Plavsic read the apology on Srpska television three

times in compliance with the Election Appeals Sub-Commission ruling).
399. See Wilkinson, supranote 33, at Al.
400. See Case No. 96-34B, supra note 382, at 147.
401. See In the Matter of Taking of Completed Voter Registration Forms From
the Voter Registration Center in Jasenica by the HDZ, Case No. 96-11 C, 2 Bilten
27 (Aug. 15, 1996) [hereinafter Case No. 96-11C].
402. See Fraudulent Voter Registration, Case No. 96-18D, 3 Bilten 47 (Aug. 30,
1996) [hereinafter Case No. 96-18D].
403. See In the Matter of Complaint Against the Mayor of the Municipality of
Bugojno and Certain Members of the Bugojno LEC for Inhibiting Voter
Education, Case No. 96-26D, 3 Bilten 135 (Sept. 10, 1996) [hereinafter Case No.
96-26D].
404. See In the Matter of Complaint by the Joint List Bilt Concerning the
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the Sub-Commission imposed appropriate penalties in partial
resolution of the violations.4"5 In the fourth, involving the police, the
circumstances demanded that less formal methods be utilized.40 6
Shortly after the completion of voter registration on July 31 st, the
Sub-Commission received a complaint from the OSCE field office in
Mostar. °7 The complaint alleged that the local branch of the Croatian
Democratic Union ("HDZ") had removed completed voter
registration forms from one of the registration centers in the
municipality and had taken them to its headquarters.0 8 Alerted to
this, OSCE's Regional Director ordered his staff to collect all voter
registration forms from registration centers within Croat-controlled
Mostar. °9 At one registration center, a worker initially refused to
provide10 the forms to OSCE without the written permission of
4

HDZ.

Under its Rules and Regulations, the PEC set up a system of local
Confiscation of Posters and Leaflets by the Police of Bihac Municipality, Case No.
96-17B, 2 Bilten 51 (Aug. 23, 1996) [hereinafter Case No. 96-17B].
405. See Case No. 96-18D, supra note 402 (ordering the removal of two
members of the local election commission and a public apology by the mayor);
Case No. 96-11 C, supra note 401 (ordering the removal of the President of the
local election commission); and Case No. 96-26D, supra note 403 (removing
another local election commissioner for her role in impeding OSCE voter
education).
406. See Case No. 96-17B, supra note 404 (noting that the violation committed
in this instance was at the hands of local police and not politicians or political
parties).
407. Mostar was a particularly unstable area. During the war there was fierce
fighting between its Muslim and Croat populations, and much of the Muslim
sector of the central city had been destroyed. In July of 1994, the European Union
("EU") and the Federation signed a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU")
providing for EU administration of the municipality for a period of two years. See
Szasz, supra note 29. In June of 1996, municipal elections were held in Mostar
under the authority of the EU. See Decree on Conduct of Elections for the City
Council and the Councils of the City Municipalities of the City of Mostar,
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE CITY OF MOSTAR (published by the EU Administrator
of Mostar), Feb. 20, 1996; Amendments, OFFICIAL GAZETTE, June 7, 1996; Decree
on the Results of the Election, OFFICIAL GAZETTE, July 11, 1996. Both the EU
administration of the municipality and the elections themselves were contentious

and controversial, and the conflict between the Muslim and Croat populations was
continuous and intense. See, e.g., HardlineCroats,supranote 26.

408. See Case No. 96-1 IC, supra note 401.
409. See id
410. See id,
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election commissions that were responsible for administering the
elections under PEC supervision."' The competent governmental
authorities were to appoint election commission members, ' subject
to PEC approval. 3 Article 21 prohibited political party members
from being appointed to the local election commission," 4 as well as
those who lacked impartiality. 415 Local election commission
responsibilities included managing voter registration and the
conducting the voting process.41 ' The thrust of these provisions
provided for local involvement in administering the elections, while
limiting partisan participation in what should be a politically neutral
activity.
The removal of completed voter registration forms by a political
party constituted a threat to the "politically neutral environment"4 7
necessary for free and fair elections."' It also cast doubt on the
ability of the local election commission in Mostar to impartially
supervise the elections 9 Even though it appeared that HDZ had
taken the forms,42 its top official for the area cavalierly denied the
party's involvement upon inquiry by the Sub-Commission.4"' Not
only did HADZ's reach extend to the supposedly non-partisan election
commissions in Croat-controlled Mostar, the party's leadership
apparently believed that it was an authority unto itself.4" Regardless,
the situation could not be tolerated if the rules were to have any
meaning.
The Sub-Commission issued a decision in this case ordering the
411. See PECRules, supranote 124, pt. III, arts. 18-35.

412. See id
413.
414.
415.
416.

See id art. 22.
See id art. 2 1(c), 21(d).
See id art. 21(e).
See PEC Rules, supra note

124, arts. 28-35 (setting forth the

responsibilities of the local election commission).
417. See Dayton Agreement, supranote 8, annex 3, art. 1.1.
418. See Case 96-I1 C, supra note 401, at 27; see also PEC Rules, supra note
124, art. 31 (providing that the election commission shall provide transport and
security for the "voting materials").
419. See id at 30 (finding the President of the local election commission

accountable for the malfeasance and removing him from office).
420. See id at 27-28 (stating that the forms were recovered in HDZ folders).
421. See id
422. See id (quoting an HDZ official as stating that party members had no
intention of "justifying [them]selves").
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immediate removal of the President of the local election commission,
assessing a civil penalty of $15,000 against HDZ, and ordering the
removal of the name from HDZ's list for cantonal elections of the
official who had refused to cooperate with the Sub-Commission's
investigation.423
The Sub-Commission issued another decision regarding the voter
registration process after investigating allegations of fraud in a Croatcontrolled section of Gomji Vakuf that involved both the self-styled
mayor and Croat members of the local election commission. 4 The
Sub-Commission found that over 900 completed registration forms
were fraudulent. It ordered the removal of two members of the local
election commission and required the mayor to issue a public
apology that was broadcast on local television and radio.425
Under the Rules and Regulations, local election commissions were
required to assist in the distribution of election and voter education
materials. 426 The International Foundation for Election Systems
("IFES") 427 had been conducting voter education in 22 municipalities
at the invitation of OSCE.42 8 In all but one, Bugojno in the
Federation, IFES had received the support of the local election
commission and other officials.42 9 IFES filed a complaint against the
mayor of Bugojno and members of the local election commission
alleging that they had obstructed the organization's efforts within
Bugojno.43 ° One of the members of the Bugojno commission was an
423. See Case No. 96-11 C, supra note 401, at 30.
424. See In the Matter of Fraudulent Voter Registration Conducted by Certain
Members of the Gornji Pvakut Local Election Commission, Case No. 96-16D, 3

Bilten 47 (Aug. 30, 1996). The municipality of Gornji Vakuf was divided into
Croat and Muslim areas, although the separation was not legally recognized by the
Federation. The local election commission effectively functioned as two separate
units, and the legal status of the "mayor" was questionable. See id.
425. See Case No. 96-18D, supra note 402, at 50 (holding that the Mayor must
make clear his commitment to free and fair elections).
426. See PECRules, supranote 124, art. 35.
427. See Case No 96-26D, supra note 403, at 135 (stating that the IFES, a nongovernmental organization ("NGO"), is funded by the United States Agency for
International Development ("USAID")).
428. See id.

429. See id.
430. See id. (stating that because of a certain "atmosphere," IFES could not
perform voter education informally and that a Mayor's assistant told IFES that
groups in Bugojno needed no voter education).
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assistant to the mayor. The Sub-Commission found that voter
education efforts were indeed obstructed, and ordered the removal of
the mayor's assistant from the local election commission."'
On August 18, the Sub-Commission received a complaint from the
Joint List432 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, alleging that police in the
Municipality of Bihac in the Federation had confiscated campaign
posters and leaflets.433 The content of the materials was satirical in
nature, but innocuous.4 " Realizing that Sub-Commission authority
over local police was minimal at best, and hoping to have the
materials returned forthwith, the Sub-Commission's Chief
Prosecutor contacted the Federation's Minister of the Interior that
day to enlist his aid in resolving the matter.435
The Minister proved cooperative, ordering the campaign materials
to be returned immediately, requesting a police report of the incident,
and instructing the officers in question to refrain from confiscating
such materials in the future.436 The day following the filing of the
complaint, the remaining materials were returned to the Joint List. 37
Shortly thereafter, the Minister of the Interior issued a directive to all
police within the Federation, instructing them to permit candidates
and political parties to freely publish and distribute campaign
48
materials.
The decision in this case described the informal resolution of the
matter,439 explained the right to freedom of expression guaranteed to

431. See id.
432. Joint List is a multiethnic coalition of political parties.
433. See Case No. 96-17B, supranote 404, at 51.
434. See id (explaining that the posters, for instance, contained slogans such as
"The Choice Exists. The Choice is The Joint List" and "Peace is Searching for
New People").
435. See id (noting that the author was the Chief Prosecutor).
436. See id
437. The police had destroyed most of the materials before the involvement of
the Federation's Interior Minister. See id

438. See Case No. 96-17B, supra note 404, at 52 (stating that the directive was
issued on Aug. 22, 1996, just days after the original complaint). The directive also
noted the importance of democratic elections and instructed the police to undertake
"energetic measures" to prevent disruptions of political party meetings. See id.
439. This is just one example of the "informal" resolution of problems
employed by the Sub-Commission. Necessity demanded it, and the legitimacy that
the Sub-Commission had established after its first few cases permitted it.
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candidates and political parties, noted that it was illegal for police to
seize legitimate campaign materials, censured the police in question,
and commended the Minister of the Interior for his prompt response
to the problem."
G. ELECTION DAY PROBLEMS

Election day problems included an OSCE administrative fiasco
that prevented numerous individuals from exercising their
franchise,4 polling and counting station irregularities," 2 allegations
of fraud in refugee voting," 3 and impediments to voting by displaced
persons."4 Looming over all of this were serious allegations that
there were more votes than voters. This latter problem is considered
in the next section, which addresses two highly significant failures of
the OSCE.
The Rules and Regulations placed time limits on both the filing
and consideration of complaints," 5 which were intended to permit
certification of the results shortly after the official vote count.446
Inartfully drafted, the Rules and Regulations were a source of deep
confusion in the days following the election.447 Nonetheless, both
440. See id. at 51.
441. See, e.g., In the Matter of Alleged Disenfranchisement of Voters in Fojnica
Due to a Lack of Absentee Ballots, Case No. 96-182, 3 Bilten 219 (Sept. 22, 1996)
[hereinafter Case No. 96-182] (finding that 35 people were disenfranchised).
442. See, e.g., In the Matter of Allegations of Voter Irregularities in Polling
Station 18 in Poplati, Case No. 96-141, 3 Bilten 211 (Sept. 22, 1996) [hereinafter
Case No. 96-182].
443. See In the Matter of Allegations of Irregularities Regarding Refugee
Voting from Serbia to Croatia, Case No. 96-137, 3 Bilten 191 (Sept. 22, 1996)
[hereinafter Case No. 96-137] (stating irregularities such as flooding certain
districts with refugees and permitting double voting by refugees from neighboring
countries).
444. See In re Several Complaints that the Bosniak Displaced Persons (DPs)
Who Wanted to Vote Where They Resided in 1991 in Territory that Is Now Part of
Republika Srpska Were Prevented or Discouraged From Doing So, Case Nos. 96103, 96-130, 96-152, and 96-160, 3 Bilten 167 (Sept. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Case
Nos. 96-103, 96-130, 96-152, and 96-160] (citing inadequacies of the system for
displaced persons).
445. See PEC Rules, supra note 124, art. 137 (empowering the PEC to include a
procedure to lodge complaints).
446. See Report to Head of Mission, supra note 31, at 11, 16, 18 (noting the
period between election day, Sept. 14, and the date of the final decision, Sept. 28).
447. Three supplements to the Rules and Regulations were issued prior to
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political reality and a reasonable interpretation of the Rules led to a
September 28th deadline by which the Sub-Commission was to
dispose of all pending cases." 8 Before certifying the results of the
elections, the Provisional Election Commission was required to
satisfy itself that all significant complaints had been resolved. " '
1. Problems with the Voter List
On election day, numerous appeals were filed by voters who were
unable to vote because their names could not be found on the voters'
lists at polling stations throughout the country'
A total count
proved impossible. 5t In considering this matter, the SubCommission found that the problem was occasioned by a change in
the format from the provisional voters' lists used during the
registration period and the final voters lists used on election day. As
a result, the names were organized differently, greatly confusing
poll-workers and resulting in an indeterminate number of citizens
who were disenfranchised.4 2
The Sub-Commission found that the number of individuals
affected was "not sufficient to call into question the integrity of the
elections. 53 It recommended, however, that the Provisional Election
Commission review the problems "as a matter of the utmost

election day. Two of the supplements contained provisions addressing time limits,
although they did not provide the desired clarity. Since the matter was ultimately
resolved, there is little value in providing an exegesis of the applicable provisions
here.
448. Between September 14th and September 28th, the Sub-Commission issued
98 decisions.
449. See PEC Rules, supra note 124, art. 235.4 (stating that "[t]he Provisional
Election Commission shall issue its certification of each election when it is
satisfied that all complaints which could affect significantly the election results
have been dealt with").
450. See Report to Head of Mission, supra note 3 1, at 16. The Sub-Commission
received over 300 appeals filed in person on election day at its offices in Sarajevo.
Many others were ified by individuals and political parties at OSCE offices. See id
451. See In the Matter of Allegations of Names Not Being on the Final Voter's
List on Election Day, Case No. 96-123, 3 Bilten 159 (Sept. 18, 1996) [hereinafter
Case No. 96-123] (finding it difficult to estimate the number, but rejecting the
"exaggerated allegations" that appeared in the press).
452. See ICG REPORT, supra note 255, at 25 (noting reports of election
observers estimating that 5% of the potential electorate was a reasonable estimate).
453. Id

AM. U INT'L L. RE v.

[13:553

urgency" in view of the upcoming municipal elections. 4 As a
practical matter, there was little the Sub-Commission could do in this
situation.4 " It was satisfied that the problems were inadvertent and
that they did not constitute a violation of the Rules and Regulations.
The elections had taken place, the counting had begun, and it was
simply not feasible to reopen the polls so that these people could
vote.
2. Pollingand Counting CenterIrregularities
The Provisional Election Commission Rules and Regulations set
forth a number of provisions with respect to both the conduct of
voting and the counting of ballots, including requirements for polling
and counting station personnel.456 There were numerous problems
reported by OSCE election supervisors, international monitors, and
others.457 Working very quickly, Sub-Commission staff reviewed
reports from the field and contacted OSCE staff in the various
locations. The Sub-Commission made a number of specific findings
in these areas and removed a number of officials from their positions.
In one decision, it recommended to the Provisional Election
Commission that the results from a particular polling station be
nullified.458

454. Id.at 19 (suggesting that the PEC revert to the format of the provisional
voters list rather than the final voters list).
455. See id. (calling the problems merely an administrative mishap).
456. See PEC Rules, supranote 124, supp. 1-3.
457. See Report to Head of Mission, supra note 31, at 16-17. Polling station
problems included the acceptance of false voter identifications, the failure to "ink"
voters, the presence of candidates and campaign materials in polling stations, the
failure to complete required OSCE paperwork, the provision of unnecessary
"assistance" to voters, and the failure to permit opposition representatives from
officially noting their objections in the polling station log books. Counting-related
irregularities included breaches in safeguarding ballot boxes, the intentional
spoiling of ballots during the count, defective procedures in the chain of custody of
the ballots, and the lack of required paperwork to accompany the ballots to the
counting centers.
458. See Integrity of the Vote at Polling Station 28, Case No. 96-140, 3 Bilten
163 (1996) [hereinafter Case No. 96-140]. The power to annul results was in the
"only and exclusive competence of the [PEC]." PEC Rules, supra note 124, art.
226. The PEC was unable to implement this recommendation because the ballots
from the polling station in question had been mixed with other ballots at a central
counting site.
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3. Alleged Fraud in Refugee Voting
In one decision, the Sub-Commission responded to a number of
complaints filed by the SDA alleging irregularities with respect to
refugee voting, including double-voting by refugees living in Croatia
and Serbia. 4 9 OSCE had provided for an ambitious program of
refugee voting that extended to 58 countries.46" There were
registration and voting components to the program in each country.
Each country's procedures for refugee voting, however, were outside
the administrative control of the OSCE and the PEC. With one
exception, all refugee voting took place in advance of election day in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.46 While there was a great deal of criticism
regarding the effectiveness of the refugee voting program, it
generally fell outside the enforcement jurisdiction of the SubCommission.462 In this case, however, refugee voting irregularities
involved actual balloting within Bosnia and Herzegovina on election
463
day.
Specifically, the complaints alleged that authorities in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY") 464 had coerced refugees from the
Federation to vote in certain areas. It also alleged that some of the
refugees had voted twice: first they voted in the country in which
they were living, and later they crossed the border in Bosnia and
Herzegovina to vote again on election day. On the basis of a number
of reports, the Sub-Commission found that Serb refugees in FRY had
been coerced into voting in specific areas of Republika Srpska in
order to receive refugee benefits. 465 FRY authorities, however, were
459. See Case No. 96-137, supra note 443, at 191-92.

460. See RESG Final Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina National and Cantonal
Elections Abroad, Oct. 11, 1996 [hereinafter RESG Final Report]. According to
the Refugee Elections Steering Group ("RESG") in Vienna, established under the
auspices of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, over 630,00 refugees
living in 58 countries registered to vote; 80% voted in the elections of September
14th. See id
461. See RESG Final Report, supranote 460, pt. VII.2 (noting that to correct an
administrative error, in-person voting in Dubrovnik in the Republic of Croatia was
repeated on election day).

462. See Case No. 96-137, supra note 443, at 191.
463. See id at 192.
464. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consists of the former socialist
Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and Montenegro.
465. See id

AM. U. INT' L. REv.

[13:553

outside the Sub-Commission's jurisdiction.466
The Sub-Commission also considered reports of alleged double
voting and discovered that there was no mechanism in place to
prevent such an occurrence.46 7 While voters from within Bosnia and
Herzegovina had to have their fingers marked with invisible ink to
prevent double voting,4 68 there was no such requirement for
refugees.4 69 Therefore, it would have been possible to vote in either
Serbia or Croatia and to vote again in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
Sub-Commission expressed its "grave concern" with this loophole,
but was not presented with specific evidence that this had
occurred.47 Therefore, it could only recommend that the PEC fix the
problem in advance of the municipal elections.47
4. Impediments to Voting
Given the recent history of horrific violence in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, there were fears that election day would be marred by
major incidents of violence.472 That fear was not realized, as election
day was largely peaceful. The failures in implementing key
provisions of the Dayton Agreement, however, had an effect on the
ability of many displaced persons to vote in their pre-war homes.473
This problem was addressed by the Sub-Commission in a decision
issued in response to numerous complaints.474 In its decision, the
Sub-Commission estimated that up to 30,000 Bosniacs, then living in
466. See id. at 191.
467. See id (finding it possible for a refugee to vote first by absentee ballot

outside of Bosnia and, later, cast his or her vote in person within Bosnia).
468. See PEC Rules, supra note 124, art. 98 (explaining that "[tjo prevent voters
from voting more than once, invisible ink detectable with an ultraviolet light will
be used. Each voter will be checked for invisible ink stain with the ultraviolet light
prior to being processed to receive their ballot.").
469. Seeid. art. 113.
470. See Case No. 96-137, supra note 443, at 191-92.
471. See Report to Head of Mission, supra note 31, at 19.
472. Citing the obligation to protect "freedom of movement," the Election
Appeals Sub-Commission required local authorities to ensure that the voters would
not suffer "violence of any kind" on election day. See Advisory Opinion 7, supra
note 239, at 143.
473. See Case Nos. 96-103, 96-130, 96-152, and 96-160, supra note 444, at 167
(stating that the Dayton Agreement held out a promise to "weary and war-battered
citizens" of Bosnia to vote where they lived in 1991).
474. See id
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the Federation, were discouraged from voting in their former homes
in Republika Srpska.4" The decision noted that a major objective of
the Dayton Agreement was to facilitate the return of citizens to their
1991 homes and to provide them an opportunity to vote there in the
OSCE-supervised elections.476 The Sub-Commission found,
however, that security arrangements in place on election day were
inadequate to fufill that objective. 4 "
The decision examined a number of factors that contributed to this
state of affairs, but ultimately concluded that the problems were not
of a scale to have affected the outcome of the elections. s The SubCommission noted, however, that the problems identified could have
an impact on municipal elections and recommended to the PEC that
steps be taken to resolve the problems in advance of those
elections.479

H. OSCE FAILURES-OVERALL VOTE COUNT AND
ALLOCATION OF SEATS

Two controversial decisions demonstrate the Sub-Commission's
role as an independent voice within the OSCE Mission. One
involved allegations that too many people voted in the elections."
The other, which came long after the certification of the elections,
found that the PEC had failed to apply the proportional
representation formula in the Rules and Regulations to the detriment
475. See id at 170 (finding a wide range in the estimate: 6,000 to 30,000).

According to IFOR, approximately 12,000 Bosniacs had in fact crossed into
Republika Srpska to vote on election day. See id. at 171.
476. See idt at 167; see also Dayton Agreement, supra note 8, annex 4, art. 11.5
(explaining that "[a]ll refugees and displaced persons have the right to freely

return to their homes of origin"); id annex 3, art. IV.1 (explaining that "[a) citizen
who no longer lives in the municipality in which he or she resided in 1991 shall, as
a general rule, be expected to vote, in person or by absentee ballot, in that
municipality"). PEC Rules and Regulations follow this objective. See PEC Rules,
supra note 124, art. 8 (stating that "[e]very effort will be made by OSCE and other
international organizations concerned to facilitate the return of citizens to the
municipality where they were registered in 1991 to vote in person").

477. See Case Nos. 96-103, 96-130, 96-152, 96-160, supranote 444, at 170-72.
478. See id at 171.
479. See id
480. See Interim Judgment-Allegations Regarding the Number of Votes Cast,
Case Nos. 96-195, 96-193, 96-183, 3 Bilten 223 (Sept. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Case
Nos. 96-195, 96-193, 96-183].
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of opposition candidates.481
1. Overall Vote Count
After the election, the Sub-Commission received complaints by
the SDA and the International Crisis Group ("ICG") 4s2 alleging that
the voter turn-out was too high.483 ICG's analysis of the data
concluded that the turn-out as a proportion of the maximum
electorate could have been as high as 103.9 percent.4s In arriving at
this figure, ICG used an estimate of 2.9 million potential voters as its
starting point.485 This number had been used by a number of
international organizations
for planning purposes and had been
48 6
adopted by the OSCE.
The Sub-Commission's analysis of the data lead to a "conservative
estimate" that the maximum number of eligible voters was closer to
3.2 million.487 This put the turn-out percentage, conservatively, at
seventy-seven percent, although the Sub-Commission noted that it
had not taken into consideration a number of factors "known to have
placed obstacles in the way of certain voters or groups of voters."488
The Sub-Commission concluded that the seventy-seven percent
figure was sufficiently high to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the
vote, particularly in light of the "cumulative effect of the problems

481. See Supplemental Judgment-Number of Seats Allocated to Political
Parties Case No. 96-225-S, Oct. 23, 1996 [hereinafter Case No. 96-225-S]. By the
time this decision was issued, Volume 3 of the Bilten had already gone to press. It

remains unpublished in an official source.
482. ICG is an international non-governmental organization monitoring the
implementation of the Dayton Agreement. Prior to filing the complaint, it had been
a major critic of the OSCE, including the Sub-Commission. See discussion, infra
pt. VI.A.
483. See Case Nos. 96-195, 96-193, 96-183, supra note 480.
484. See ICG REPORT, supra note 255, at 30-32.
485. See id. at 30.
486. Jeff Fischer, OSCE Director-General of Elections, acknowledged that the
OSCE had been inconsistent in its estimates of the voting population and had used
the 2.9 million figure for some purposes, but not others. See Jeff Fischer,
Responses, Transcript of IFOR Press Briefing 7-8, 13, Sept. 28, 1996 [hereinafter
IFOR Press Briefing], available at <http://www.nato.int/ifor/afsouth/t960928a.
htm>.
487. See Case Nos. 96-195, 96-193, 96-183, supra note 480, at 224.
488. Id.
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identified in previous decisions,'" 9 such as disenfranchisement due
to problems with the voters list, the possibility of double voting by
refugees, impediments to voting by displaced persons, and various
instances of fraud in particular polling places. The Sub-Commission
recommended that the PEC order a complete recount to determine if
the high turnout was due simply to miscalculations or fraud. In
reaching the decision, the members of the Sub-Commission publicly
declared their unanimity for only the second time.49
It is difficult to overstate the pressures on the Sub-Commission as
it considered this matter. Its recommendation, in turn, placed
enormous pressure on the PEC. In the days following the election,
there had been a feeding frenzy among the international press over
this issue.491 The PEC, which alone had competence to order a
recount, declined to follow the recommendation and ultimately
weathered the storm.
2. Allocation of Seats
On September 28th, the Sub-Commission disposed of all its
pending cases, setting the stage for PEC certification of the election
results the following day.492 One of the decisions issued that day was
in response to complaints filed by several opposition parties. In each
complaint, the party alleged that it was not allocated the proper
number of seats required by the proportional representation formula
set forth in the Rules and Regulations. 493 After staff had briefly
discussed the matter with the OSCE Mission officials, the SubCommission issued a one-page decision.4" It acknowledged that the
489. Id
490. See id
491. An example of the press interest in this matter can be seen in the Press
Briefing attended by Ambassador Frowick and other high ranking OSCE officials
on September 28, 1996. See IFOR Press Briefing, supranote 486, at 5-18.
492. See Cases Pending Before the Election Appeals Sub-Commission Case No.
96-240, 3 Bilten 259 (Sept. 28, 1996) [hereinafter Case No. 96-240] (ruling that
there were no cases pending before the Sub-Commission that required a
determination).
493. See Case No. 96-225, supra note 250, at 255 (maintaining that the formula
set out in Article 115 of the PEC Rules and Regulations leads to a different
allocation of electoral seats).
494. See id (acknowledging the parties' allegations and ordering further

review).
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formula could be confusing and referred the matter to the PEC with a
recommendation to check the calculations and inform the
complainants as to how the calculations were made.495 It also
requested that it be provided with a copy of any redetermination.496
At this point, the Sub-Commission believed it had completed its
decision-making with respect to the elections of September 14th.
This was not the case.
On October 14th, one of the original complainants once again
asked the Sub-Commission to investigate the matter.497 The SubCommission forwarded a copy of the new complaint to the PEC,
urgently requesting that a copy of any redetermination and method of
calculation be provided.498 As the Sub-Commission attempted to
resolve the matter, a number of conversations between OSCE
officials and Sub-Commission staff ensued. On October 22nd, the
PEC responded to the Sub-Commission.499 On the following day, the
Sub-Commission issued its decision. 500
Before reaching the decision, however, the Sub-Commission staff
conducted an internal review of what had happened. 50' It was not an
easy task, as many members of the Mission had already left Sarajevo
and others cooperated with the Sub-Commission only reluctantly.
Nonetheless, the Sub-Commission staff was able to determine that
the formula published in the Rules and Regulations was not the
formula that had been used in allocating seats after the voting.0 2
495. See id.

496. See id. (stating "[a] copy of this re-determination should be provided to the
Election Appeals Sub-Commission").
497. The complaint referred to a statement attributed to OSCE Spokesman
David Foley. The ONASA News Agency in Sarajevo had reported that Mr. Foley

had indicated that "the original formula... for calculating the votes 'did not
work' .... Due to the 'rush of events' preceding the elections, Foley said the
OSCE quickly employed the new formula but did not publicize the change...
Foley apologized for the confusion, but added that the [PEC] ... unanimously
verified the election results." OSCE Apologizes for Not Disclosing Election
FormulaSwitch, ONASA, Oct. 10, 1996 [hereinafter OSCE Apologizesj.

498. See Case No. 96-225-S, supra note 481.
499. See id.

500. See id.
501. See id. (discussing the Sub-Commission's review of the Article 91 formula,
its applicability, and the changes that the OSCE made).
502. See OSCE Rule Change Favours Ruling Parties,AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
Oct. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, News library, Curnws File [hereinafter OSCE
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The formula set forth in the Rules and Regulations was designed
to be used in the various legislative elections to be held on
September 14th.1 3 After the postponement of the elections for
municipal assemblies, fourteen elections were left to which a
proportional representation formula was to be applied."' The Rules
and Regulations provided a fairly straightforward system to allocate
the votes (the "Article 91 formula"), and included a hypothetical to
illustrate how that system would work. 5 In its decision, the SubCommission explained it as follows:
The operation of the Article 91 formula is thus a two stage process. An
initial allocation is made on the basis of simple proportionality. Those
parties which receive at least one seat in the initial allocation then qualify
value.
to receive further, unallocated seats, on the basis of their remainder
50 6
The Article 91 formula is simple to understand and operate.

There was only one problem with the formula. In certain
hypothetical situations, the simple application of the formula might
fail to allocate all the seats. 07 After the publication of the formula in
the Rules and Regulation, tests were conducted at the operational
level within OSCE to see how the formula would work in practice.
Ultimately, the testing gave way to the introduction of what
Rule Change Favours Ruling Parties](finding that the original formula that all
parties agreed to was not the one used in the September 14 elections).
503. See PEC Rules, supra note 124, art. 3.
504. The fourteen elections included ten cantonal assemblies in the Federation,
the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, the House of Representatives of the
Federation, and two elections (one in each Entity) to the House of Representatives
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. See id art. 3.
505. PEC Rules, supranote 124, art. 91. The full text provides:
The system of Proportional Representation to be used will be a simple quota system in
which the initial allocation of seats will be made by dividing the total number of votes
cast in the election by the number of seats, and then dividing the number of votes cast
for each party by the resulting figure. Any remaining seats are then allocated to the
parties with the largest remainder, provided that that party has already won at least one
seat in the initial allocation. A chart showing how this system will work is attached.

Id art. 115.
506. Case No. 96-225-S, supranote 481.
507. See id (providing that "[t]his may occur when independent candidates
receive enough votes to qualify for more than one seat; where parties receive
enough votes to qualify for more seats than they have candidates on their party list;
and where the number of seats to be allocated by the remainder procedure exceeds
the number of parties qualified to receive them").
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amounted to a new formula."' 8 The full PEC, however, was not
informed about the changes until after the election." 9 The SubCommission applied both the Article 91 formula and the new
formula to the votes cast in the fourteen different elections.1 It
found that in twelve of the fourteen elections, the Article 91 formula
would have worked perfectly.51 In the other two, its failure to
allocate all the seats could have been easily resolved by an
interpretation in the spirit of the regulation.
In contrast, the Sub-Commission found that the actual application
of the new formula "worked," in the sense that it allocated all of the
seats. However, it also determined that the new formula had a
negative effect on the political opposition. 12 In nine of the elections
that would have worked perfectly under the Article 91 formula,
opposition candidates lost ten seats to the majority parties as a result
of application of the new formula. 3
The Sub-Commission noted that the PEC's actions had been
ambiguous and characterized an OSCE press statement of October
10th as "inaccurate and misleading" ' 4 in asserting that the formula
had been the subject of extensive consultation within the PEC before
the election."' The PEC first discussed the question of seat
allocations at a formal meeting several days after the election, but
was apparently advised that the actual formula had not changed." 6
The decision included the following observation with respect to the
new formula's legal status, in light of the PEC's communication to
508. See Giles Elgood, Group Says Bosnian Elections Mishandled, REUTERS
WORLD SERVICE, Oct. 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File

(stating that when the OSCE realized that the formula would not work in all
situations, it came up with a more complex formula to get around the problem).
509. See Case No. 96-225-S, supranote 481 (noting that the OSCE adjusted the
formula without consulting the PEC).
510. See OSCE Change Favours Ruling Party,supra note 502.
511. See Case No. 96-225-S, supra note 481; see also Elgood, supra note 508
(stating that OSCE apologized for the change in formulas because it knew two

parties were affected).
512. See id. (noting that the opposing parties complained that they have lost out
under the new system).
513. See id. (stating that the new formula affected approximately ten seats
across eight different ruling bodies).
514. See Case No. 96-225-S, supra note 481.
515. See id.

516. See id. The meeting took place on Sept. 20, 1996. See id.

1998]

FROMDAYTON TO SARAJEvO

the Sub-Commission of October 22nd:
[T]he PEC acquiesced in the adoption of a method of calculation which

was different from the provisions of Article 91. In as much as the new
method of calculation departs from Article 91, the PEC must be presumed

to have acquiesced also in making the necessary amendments to Article
91.
This is, in the view of the Sub-Commission, a very unsatisfactory
situation. The Rules and Regulations of the Provisional Election

Commission form part of the domestic law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It
is a matter of grave concern that these Rules and Regulations can be
changed in such an arbitrary and casual fashion."'

The
decision
also
expressed
the
Sub-Commission's
"dissatisfaction" with the manner in which the seat allocation
formula had been addressed by the PEC and its "serious reservations
about the validity of retroactive amendments." ' 8 Ultimately,
however, the Sub-Commission was compelled to relinquish
jurisdiction."1 9 The election results had been certified; many of those
elected had already taken their seats in the various legislative bodies;
and the PEC had, however belatedly and inadequately, ratified its
previous actions."
It is important to understand that the very purpose of any
proportional representation system is to provide a voice to the
political opposition. The PEC's actions in changing the formula
effectively took ten seats from the political opposition and gave them
to the three majority parties."' The significance of this decision is
that an OSCE body finally provided a full and accurate accounting of
what had occurred in the seat allocation controversy. Anyone with a
pocket calculator and a modicum of patience could have tested the
Article 91 formula against the official results in nine elections and
found that it had not been properly applied. The complainants, and
the public, deserved an explanation. Within 48 hours of the issuance
517. Id
518. Id
519. See Case No. 96-225-S, supra note 481; see also NATO-IFOR Press
Briefing, Oct. 29, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
[hereinafter NATO-IFOR Press Briefing] (noting that after the PEC's response to
the actions of the OSCE, the Sub-Commission relinquished jurisdiction).
520. See NATO-IFOR Press Briefing, supranote 519.
521. See id
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of this decision, there were efforts within OSCE to immediately
dissolve the Sub-Commission. These efforts were not successful, and
no formal proposal to dissolve the Sub-Commission was ever made
to the PEC.

VI. JUDGING THE JUDGES: WAS THE ELECTION
APPEALS SUB-COMMISSION EFFECTIVE?
There are challenges in attempting to assess the effectiveness of an
enforcement body such as the Sub-Commission, particularly for
someone so closely associated with it. How is effectiveness defined
and measured? To what extent does it depend on expectations? A
useful comparison could be made to the overall efforts of the
international community, both civil and military, in implementing
key provisions of the Dayton Agreement, i.e., can the
implementation be considered a success? Dropping down a level, it
may be useful to measure the effectiveness with reference to the
OSCE supervision of the elections, i.e., to what extent did the OSCE
fulfill its mandate under Annex 3 to the Dayton Agreement?
Ultimately, however, the Sub-Commission's relative effectiveness
must be viewed within its own limited sphere. The true test in
evaluating the Sub-Commission is how it fulfilled its own mandate
to enforce the Rules and Regulations of the Provisional Election
Commission.1 2 Such an evaluation is highly subjective. In
attempting to draw a reasoned conclusion, however, it is useful to
look to the following: the assessment of the Sub-Commission's
performance by critics and others, the extent to which participants in
the elections exhibited confidence in the Sub-Commission as an
institution, and compliance with Sub-Commission decisions.
A. ASSESSMENT OF OTHERS
To date, only the ICG 23 has thoroughly and formally examined the
performance of the Sub-Commission. The ICG has been a persistent
critic of the OSCE. In August 1996, the watchdog organization
called for a "postponement of the elections in Bosnia and
522. See PEC Rules, supra note 124, art. 137-44 (establishing the Election
Appeals Sub-Commission and its role as enforcer of the PEC Rules and
Regulations).
523. See ICG REPORT, supranote 255 (describing the ICG).
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Herzegovina on the grounds that the minimum conditions for a free
and fair poll did not exist."" After the elections, it concluded: "On
the basis of [the] failure to achieve the required conditions for
holding the elections, disenfianchisement, electoral engineering, and
the preliminary vote count results, the September 14th elections in
Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be considered free and fair as
' In this same report, the ICG
required by the [Dayton Agreement]."525
described the Sub-Commission as "the one organ within the OSCE
which could effectively ensure compliance with the [Dayton
Agreement] and the PEC Rules and Regulations."" 6 In its analysis of
the decisions prior to the elections, it criticized the SubCommission's reluctance "to resort to serious sanctions despite the
considerable powers available to it. ' The report was particularly
harsh in its assessment of the Sub-Commission's handling of the
secessionist speech issue late in the campaign:52
[B]y not using its mandate to sanction offenders more resolutely, even in
cases when the violations could lead to serious conflict and threaten the
whole fabric of the [Dayton Agreement], the EASC has encouraged some
of the Parties to escalate the extreme nationalist rhetoric and to flaunt
their immunity. Furthermore, the OSCE's failure to follow up on its own
warnings that candidates will be removed from party lists if serious
breaches of the [Dayton Agreement] and the Rules and Regulations were
repeated, makes a mockery of the international community's effort in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.529

In an addendum to its report issued on October 30, 1996, ICG
revisited the question of the Sub-Commission's performance.53 The
addendum focused primarily on the two decisions involving the
OSCE failures with respect to the vote count and seat allocation
" ' It noted, generally, that the Sub-Commission
controversies.53
524.
525.
526.
527.

See id at 1.
Id.
Id
Id.at 16.

528. See discussion, supra pt. V.F.4 (discussing issues in secessionism,

secessionist speech, and freedom of expression and the problems involved in
freedom of expression and ethnic nationalism).
529. ICG REPORT, supranote 255, pt. II, at 17.
530. Addendum to ICG REPORT, Oct. 30, 1996 [hereinafter Addendum to ICG
REPORT].

531. See discussion, supra pts. V.H.1-V.H.2. ICG was one of the complainants
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"functioned under difficult political conditions and with severe
limitations [in terms of resources]." 532 The examination concluded
with the following reappraisal:
[T]he EASC contributed significantly to the electoral process in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, especially in view of the shortcomings of the OSCE's
other elections supervisory and monitoring bodies.... In the final
analysis, the EASC was the only body within the OSCE which undertook
to ensure that international
standards for a free, fair and democratic
533
election were upheld.

Ed Van Thijn, the Coordinator of International Monitoring
("CIM") for the September 14th elections, issued a statement
addressing the appeals process indicating his "overall" support for
the Sub-Commission's judgments and noting that its rulings on
campaign violence and voter registration problems confirmed his
own "critical analysis" of these issues.5 34 He concluded his brief

commentary as follows:
The CIM evaluates positively the transparent and relatively simple EASC
procedures for lodging complaints, and recommends greater voter
education regarding these procedures for the municipal elections.
The CIM considers the Appeals Mechanism to be installed for future
elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina could gain further credibility by
strengthening its activities in terms of scope and effectiveness in ensuring
the respect of electoral rules and regulations, and by ensuring a larger
degree of autonomy from other bodies
responsible for the organization of
5 35
the elections, including the [PEC].

Other than the thorough and direct examination by the ICG and the
bland and careful assessment by the CIM, there has been little
analysis of the Sub-Commission's performance and effectiveness.
in the Vote Count Case. See Case No. 96-214, supra note 238.
532. Addendum to ICG REPORT 9, supra note 530.
533. Id.
534. See Second Statement of the Coordinator for International Monitoring 4,
Sept. 24, 1996 [hereinafter Second Statement]. The Chairman-in-Office of the
OSCE had appointed Mr. Van Thijn as CIM in March of 1996. It was his
responsibility to make an assessment of the entire electoral process to see if
various objectives under the Dayton Agreement had been met. See Preliminary
Statement of the CIM I, Sept. 14, 1996.
535. Second Statement, supra note 534, at 4.
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There were news articles prior to the elections highly critical of the
overall OSCE effort that implicated the Sub-Commission.531 6 None,
however, analyzed the Sub-Commission's work in a detailed way.537
In the United States, there was some congressional testimony. After
the elections, a representative from the Human Rights Watch group
addressed the Sub-Commission's role:
We call on the OSCE's Election Appeals Subcommission to strike from
the ballot those candidates for municipal positions who have participated
in attacks on opposition members, engaged in serious violations or
manipulation of other elections rules and regulations, or who have

participated in restricting freedom of movement.
The rules and regulations of the [PEC] permit them to take such action.
While they did exercise this mandate during the general elections, it was

like to see a concentrated effort to
to a very limited extent, and we would
538
apply penalties where appropriate.

Within the OSCE Mission, there was a general view that the SubCommission had performed its job well. In a written response to
ICG's criticism of the elections, the former Acting Chairman of the
PEC noted favorably: "The [EASC], consisting of Muslim, Croat and
Serb judges with a Norwegian chairman, imposed a number of
penalties for breaches of the electoral rules (mostly by the three
ruling parties). These included fines, disqualification of candidates
and dismissal of corrupt election officials."53' 9 This reflected Sir
Kenneth's oft-stated views as to the value of the Sub-Commission.
At a formal dinner of the Sub-Commission and the PEC held in Pale
on September 8th, for instance, he referred to the Sub-Commission
as the PEC's "muscle." While this can be viewed as the type of selfcongratulatory rhetoric that often characterizes remarks at such
536. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supranote 25, at Al (stating that the Sub-Commision
had too many cases, too few resources, and insufficient time and information to
obtain evidence for prosecution); Spolar, supra note 390, at A17 (noting the SubCommission's insufficient resources, suggesting that itwas not doing enough).
537. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 25, at Al. The Wilkinson piece contains
some inaccuracies.
538. Bosnia Peace Process: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on European
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations, 104th Cong. 127 (Oct. 1, 1996)

(statement of Diane Paul, Helsinki Researcher, Human Rights Watch).
539. Scott, supranote 333.
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events, it fairly represented the informal comments of many within
the OSCE Mission that the Sub-Commission's efforts had been
helpful.
Additional evidence that the Sub-Commission was viewed
positively was demonstrated in the two weeks between election day
and PEC certification of the results. During that time, high-ranking
officials of the OSCE from outside the Mission and interested
foreign governments visited Sub-Commission offices to be briefed
on significant issues that had arisen.
Finally, there was a great amount of both international and local
press coverage of major Sub-Commission rulings, which indicates
that the rulings were significant. Indeed the reported criticisms of the
Sub-Commission by some of the participants show that the rulings
had some effect.54
B. MAKING USE OF THE SUB-COMMISSION

Another measure of an enforcement body's effectiveness is the
extent to which it is utilized. The PEC had referred the Silajdzic case
" '
to the Sub-Commission even before it was officially constituted.54
Its decisive action in that case no doubt persuaded the PEC to turn to
the Sub-Commission when faced with difficult problems during the
campaign. The PEC saw the value in referring controversial matters
to the Sub-Commission and in being able to announce that the SubCommission was considering cases so that it could deflect criticism.
This suggests that there was sufficient local confidence in the
workings of the Sub-Commission to provide the OSCE with this type
of political cover.
In addition to the PEC, as the campaign progressed, the actual
participants in the process increasingly made use of the complaint
process. In its first month, the Sub-Commission issued only a
handful of rulings. By election day, it had issued 53 decisions and
seven advisory opinions. After election day, it issued 100 additional
decisions. Those who were respondents in early Sub-Commission
proceedings apparently decided it was advantageous for them to
540. See, e.g., KrajisnikProtests OSCE Finefor SDS, supra note 285.
541. See discussion, supra pt. V.E. (discussing the establishment of the SubCommission and the importance of the Silajdzic case).
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become complainants.542 Even the IGC, so critical of the SubCommission, decided to file a complaint in the Vote Count Case. 3
The obvious conclusion is that the various complainants, whatever
their particular motivation, found it worthwhile to bring cases before
the Sub-Commission.
C. COMPLIANCE WITH SUB-COMMISSION RULINGS

There was a high degree of compliance with Sub-Commission
rulings. This is particularly evident in the various public apologies
made by respondents prior to the elections. True, the record is not
perfect. At one point, SDS candidates and Republika Srpska
government officials ignored a Sub-Commission advisory opinion
and even continued to defy the Sub-Commission after it had assessed
penalties in a subsequent case. ' Even in that case, however, Biljana
Plavsic was finally persuaded to capitulate and delivered a public
apology on the eve of the elections that had been written by the SubCommission. 45
Respect for Sub-Commission decisions was also seen through
informal contacts with individuals who had been penalized. One
HDZ candidate who had been removed from the party list for
cantonal elections contacted the Sub-Commission to ascertain if it
was permissible for him to otherwise stay involved in the elections as
a party official. He was told that he could. An angry mayor who had
been ordered to make a public apology in a fraudulent voter
registration case contacted the Sub-Commission to complain and to
try to negotiate details. When told the matter was non-negotiable, he
reluctantly made himself available for the taping of the apology by
OSCE officials.
Finally, the Sub-Commission was able to resolve a number of
matters informally, even where its actual jurisdiction was
questionable. The Sub-Commission engineered an agreement with
the SDS on the use of Karadzic posters late in the campaign,5 6 and
542. The SDA, for instance, was penalized early on the Silajdzic and other
cases. At the end, SDA had itself become one of the more prolific complainants.
543. See Case No. No. 96-214, supranote 238.
544. See discussion, suprapt. V.F.4.

545. See discussion, supranotes 394-99 and accompanying text.
546. See discussion, supranote 390 and accompanying text.
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was able to establish a fruitful relationship with the Federation
Minister of the Interior to curb police abuses and to provide at least
for opposition parties and candidates in their
minimal protections
5 47
campaigns.
D. CONCLUSIONS

Based on the above considerations, the Sub-Commission can be
seen as having been reasonably effective in its enforcement role. Its
decisions were generally respected, and the individuals and entities
for which it was designed had sufficient confidence in it to make use
of the complaint process. Indeed, the essence of the published
criticism of the Sub-Commission's performance was that it did not
do enough. This is considered below.

VII. LESSONS LEARNED
A. WHY THE SUB-COMMISSION WAS EFFECTIVE

If there is a common theme on how the Sub-Commission
conducted itself, it is the sense of balance it exhibited in carrying out
its responsibilities. First, it had to balance its notional independence
with the reality that its authority derived from the Provisional
Election Commission.5 48 It was truly a sub-commission. Second,
despite the fact that it was described as and acted as a "juridical
body, 5 49 it had to weigh legal considerations against political reality.
Without the political support of the PEC and the Head of the OSCE
Mission, it could not have been effective. From the beginning, the
Sub-Commission had a good sense of how far it could go. Moreover,
the Sub-Commission had to balance the need to punish and deter
violations with its overall goal that the elections go forward as
mandated by the Dayton Agreement. In this connection, it was
essential that the Bosnians themselves, particularly the political
parties, support Sub-Commission decisions. The Sub-Commission
had to establish that its decisions were fair and well-reasoned, even if

547. See discussion, supranotes 436-38 and accompanying text.
548. See PEC Rules, supranote 124, art. 137 (establishing the Election Appeals
Sub-Commission and noting that the powers are delegated by the PEC).
549. Id.
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particular ones were unwelcome by some. Third, the SubCommission had to balance fundamental notions of due process with
the need to resolve cases quickly. There were insufficient time and
resources to conduct the type of proceedings that would pass muster
in established Western democracies.
There are a number of specific factors that underlie the SubCommission's effectiveness as an enforcement body. They include
the following: real enforcement powers, personnel, insulation from
nationalist pressures, impartiality, and speed of decisions.
B. ENFORCEMENT POWERS

Without meaningful enforcement powers, the Sub-Commission
would have been irrelevant. Under PEC Rules and Regulations, the
Sub-Commission could generally impose "appropriate penalties
and/or fines."55 As a practical matter, this general authority would
not have been worth very much if the Sub-Commission had to go
outside the OSCE Mission to enforce its decisions. Fortunately, the
PEC gave the Sub-Commission the specific power to terminate
candidacies by ordering the removal of candidates' names from
" ' The PEC controlled party and individual
ballots or party lists.55
candidate registration as well as party lists, so the Sub-Commission
could readily implement a ruling to terminate candidacies. This was
the Sub-Commission's single most important enforcement tool, and
it was used sparingly. Indeed, after the names of seven candidates
were struck from the SDA's list for municipal elections in July for
the attack on Dr. Silajdzic, only two others had their candidacies
terminated. In other cases, however, the Sub-Commission threatened
the sanction if respondents did not comply promptly with SubCommission decisions. This threat induced several respondents to
comply with Sub-Commission orders to issue public apologies and to
take other steps to remedy violations. Without it, there would have
been no public apologies or other meaningful compliance with SubCommission decisions.
The Sub-Commission was able to assess monetary penalties
550. PEC Rules, supranote 124, art. 140.
551. See id art. 141. The rules also permitted the Sub-Commission to decertify
a political party, a very tough sanction. As a practical matter, it could only have
been used in the most extreme situation.
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against political parties, but only to the extent of their entitlement to
a form of public financing administered by the OSCE Mission. These
were useful in the sense that they were widely reported in the press.
In its own right, the withholding of campaign funds from the major
parties was not a significant deterrent. Since they all controlled the
organs of government, the money itself was not all that important to
them.
Finally, under its general authority, the Sub-Commission was able
to remove individuals from positions of authority in the system of
local election commissions that had been set up by the OSCE
Mission. Since these individuals could lose payment for their service
on the commissions, it was a legitimate enforcement tool.
C. PERSONNEL
The enforcement powers themselves were important, but so was
the willingness and ability of the Sub-Commission to use these
powers in creative and meaningful ways. This resulted from the
quality of individuals who made up the Sub-Commission. The
Bosnian judges on the Sub-Commission were people of uncommon
integrity, who brought vast experience and dedication to their jobs.
Under the skilled leadership of the Chairman, Finn Lynghjem of
Norway, they developed a rapport with one another that permitted
the Sub-Commission to become the juridical body envisioned in the
PEC Rules and Regulations. A Muslim, a Croat, and a Serb
genuinely liked and respected one another. The atmosphere at SubCommission meetings was cordial. While not unmindful of practical
and political realities, they were all judges who saw their role on the
Sub-Commission to make legal judgments in concrete cases. The
Bosnian members were fully engaged in the decision-making. The
Bosnian lawyers, two of whom were judges themselves, also made
great contributions to the effective functioning of the SubCommission.
The international legal staff included individuals with experience
and expertise in elections, the workings of enforcement agencies,
investigations, litigation, the laws and institutions of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and freedom of expression. The Sub-Commission's
Special Investigator had 25 years of experience as a policeman in the
United States. It is hard to conceive how the job would have been
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done without the talents of these individuals, supported by a local
staff of translators and interpreters.
D. INSULATION FROM NATIONALIST PRESSURES
As noted earlier,5 2 the Bosnian members of the Sub-Commission
were largely insulated from nationalist pressures by the secrecy of
the proceedings. Sub-Commission meetings were held in executive
session. The votes of individual members were not disclosed, and
there were no separate or concurring opinions. This permitted the
Bosnian judges and lawyers to speak freely at Sub-Commission
meetings, take principled positions, and make meaningful
contributions to the Sub-Commission's work without fear of
retribution or meddling from their sponsors. It was an extremely
important feature in the work of the Sub-Commission.
E. IMPARTIALITY
The fact that the three major ethnic groups in Bosnia were
represented on the Sub-Commission was an effective buffer to any
challenges of partiality. Nonetheless, there were concerns within the
Sub-Commission that it might be perceived as being too tough on the
Muslims, particularly the SDA. Its first few major decisions imposed
the most severe penalties on the SDA. This was largely unavoidable
inasmuch as the Sub-Commission had to respond to charges leveled
against the party. Eventually, however, the SDS and the HDZ
received their fair share of sanctions. It was important that all sides
could be reasonably confident that the Sub-Commission would act
against any of the nationalist parties that violated the law.
F. SPEED OF DECISIONS
Enforcement powers, dedicated personnel, and integrity mean
nothing to an enforcement body unless it can reach decisions that
have an impact on the process. The conditions under which the SubCommission had to work were difficult. The Sub-Commission's
geographical jurisdiction encompassed the entirety of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Travel was arduous; there was only one investigator,
postal service and telephones were unreliable; and there was virtually
552. See discussion, supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
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no communication possible between the two Entities."' After the
Sub-Commission first convened in early July, only ten weeks
remained until the election. Time was of the essence. The SubCommission did not have the luxury of leisurely considering a case,
fully investigating it, and providing respondents with the
opportunities to be heard that are common in Western democracies.
Quite simply, it did the best that it could within the time allowed.
This approach might best be described as "rough justice," a term
used by both Chairman Lynghjem and PEC member John Reid to
refer to the practical response of the Sub-Commission to the
necessities of the situation. The Sub-Commission cobbled together
investigations by sending out its own investigator to interview
witnesses when feasible. It relied on information from OSCE staff in
regional and field offices; it sought the cooperation of other
international organizations, such as the IPTF; and it worked with
Federation officials to gain the cooperation of local police.
Respondents were informed of complaints against them and given a
limited opportunity to present their case. Sometimes this would take
the form of an exchange of telephone calls or fax messages. In short,
the Sub-Commission did what was necessary to keep the cases
moving. This is one reason why there was a relatively high number
of dismissals. Of the 53 decisions issued before election day, thirtythree were dismissals. Some were dismissed on their obvious lack of
merit. Others were dismissed because of the Sub-Commission's
judgment that other cases were more important to the process and
more likely to lead to conclusive results. The average case was
resolved within two weeks, some within a few days. The SubCommission was determined not to become hamstrung by trying to
do more than was possible and thus ending up with no meaningful
decisions to show for it.
G. A MODEL FOR THE FUTURE
In recent years, the international community has supervised
elections in a post-conflict setting on at least five occasions." 4 Only
553. See discussion, supra pt. V.B.
554. The U.N. supervised elections in Namibia in 1989 and Cambodia in 1993.
It also had a more limited supervisory role with respect to elections held in 1997 in

Eastern Slovenia (Croatia). The European Union supervised elections in Mostar in
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in Bosnia and Herzegovina was there a significant focus on creating
a mechanism to enforce the electoral laws. Based on the experience
of the Sub-Commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would
behoove the international community to give serious consideration to
election law enforcement when it supervises elections.
In order to run an election, the election authority must establish
rules. If the rules are to be respected, they must be enforced. How
those rules are enforced should be a significant consideration in any
such effort. In essence there are two choices: 1) the political authority
itself, i.e. the OSCE or the U.N., can enforce the rules on an ad hoc
basis, or 2) it can create an enforcement body whose mandate is to
enforce the political authority's rules. In Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the PEC saw the wisdom of creating a separate enforcement body. In
so doing, it was able to concentrate its efforts on the administrative
and political questions for which it was the ultimate authority. By
establishing the Sub-Commission as a quasi-judicial body with real
enforcement powers, it gave the process credibility.
At its most basic level, the quasi-judicial model of enforcement
was only able to work in Bosnia and Herzegovina because the
Dayton Agreement was unambiguous in its grant of authority to the
OSCE to "supervise [the elections] in a manner to be determined by
the OSCE.''555 It even mandated the PEC to "[ensure] that action is
taken to remedy any violation or any provision of this Agreement or
of the electoral rules and regulations . . . including imposing
penalties against any person or body that violates such provisions.""5
There was no question as to the authority of the OSCE and PEC to
establish a body to enforce its rules. As a preliminary matter, then,
the international or regional organization supervising elections must
have clear and unambiguous authority to administer the elections in
the manner it sees fit. In the absence of such authority, the
supervision will likely be compromised.
If, however, the international or regional body has real supervisory
powers, it must write an election law with a workable enforcement
regime. The Sub-Commission model has certain advantages that
Bosnia and Herzegovina three months in advance of the OSCE-supervised
elections in September of 1996.
555. Dayton Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11.2.
556. Id
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could work in similar post-conflict situations. First, as a quasijudicial body, its decisions were widely viewed as legal
determinations that were above the political fray. Second, its
membership included representatives of the major political factions
contesting the elections, effectively blunting serious criticisms of
partiality. Third, its leadership was international, insulating its local
members from factional pressures and preventing it from
succumbing to bickering and inaction. Fourth,while it was under the
direct authority of the PEC and Head of the OSCE Mission, it had
sufficient independence to be perceived as a separate source of
authority. Fifth, its enforcement powers were real, making it possible
to both punish and deter violations.
It is time for the international community to see election law
enforcement as an integral part of election supervision. The
experience of the Election Appeals Sub-Commission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina provides a valuable lesson to those members of the
international community who are responsible for and committed to
free and fair elections.

EPILOGUE**
The previously postponed municipal elections were held in Bosnia
and Herzegovina on September 13 and 14, 1997, under the
supervision of the OSCE.557 On November 22 and 23, 1997, elections
for the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska were held, again
under the supervision of the OSCE. 558 In both cases, the Election
Appeals Sub-Commission played the same role as it had in the 1996
elections. Judge Lynghjem of Norway continued to serve as
Chairman and Chief Judge. The same Bosnian judges and lawyers
also served in their same capacities. According to Judge Lynghjem,
the Sub-Commission exercised the same powers that it had exercised

** The following account is based upon conversations and e-mail
correspondence between the author and Chairman and Chief Judge Finn Lynghjem
in late 1997 and early 1998.

557. See Report to Head of Mission, Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n Org. for
Sec. and Cooperation in Eur., Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Oct. 27, 1997.
558. See Report to Head of Mission, Election Appeals Sub-Comm'n Org. for
Sec. and Cooperation in Eur., Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, February 3,
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in 1996 with only minor changes to the Rules and Regulations of the
PEC. In Judge Lynghjem's opinion, the Sub-Commission's role in
the 1997 elections was even stronger than in 1996, since the national
factions and parties "had learned from 1996" that the SubCommission was able to enforce the law. Indeed the PEC delegated
additional authority to the Sub-Commission in September and
October of 1997 to strike elected officials who obstructed the
implementation of the municipal elections. As of this writing, the
Election Appeals Sub-Commission remains in existence and is one
of the success stories of the civilian implementation of the Dayton
Agreement.

